Wednesday, March 22, 2017

MP Abdullah Sani - Soalan Ditanya Boleh Ditambahbaik, lebih relevan,....?

Adakah persembahan Abdullah Sani bertambah baik di Parlimen? Berikut di bawah ini adalah soalan yang dikemukakan di Parlimen pada 21/3/2017..

Beliau adalah seorang Unionist - Pemegang Jawatan Timbalan Presiden MTUC sebelum ini - dan itulah sebab kita menganalisa pernyataan beliau di Parlimen untuk memastikan bahawa selaku seorang MP 'wakil pekerja', beliau akan bertambah baik mengunakan peluang beliau bersuara untuk pekerja di Parlimen... 

MP juga boleh mengeluarkan kenyataan media mengenai beraneka isu - tetapi carian 'Google' tidak diketemui apa-apa kenyataan media yang dikeluarkan MP ini...

Pekerja dan Kesatuan perlu sangat mendampingi seberapa banyak MP, ADUN dan/atau Senator supaya mereka mengetahui isu pekerja dengan jelas - justeru lebih ramai akan tahu, dan mungkin akan berpihak pekerja dalam perjuangan pekerja dan kesatuan...
 
15 soalan sahaja setiap sesi untuk seorang Ahli Parlimen - justeru harus digunakan dengan baik untuk mendapatkan faedah maksima ...

MP Abdullah Sani, Pemangku Presiden MTUC - Analisa Soalan Parlimen - Ada kekurangan?Boleh bertambah baik?

MP Abdullah Sani - Ucapan Parlimen 25/10/2016 - Satu Penilaian? 

Komen soalan terbaru ini:-

- Nampaknya MP ini sendiri tak membuat kajian sendiri mengenai Perjanjian ini...adakah dia tahu kandungan perjanjian ini? Adakah beliau berbincang dengan RUM terlebih dahulu? Adakah RUM sendiri membuat penyelidikan mengenai perjanjian ini? Adakah RUM ada apa-apa kerisauan mengenai perjanjian ini - adakah terdapat apa-apa kenyataan umum? Adakah ini isu yang perlu ditimbulkan kini? 

- Dari soalan susulan, nampaknya MP sendiri tak tahu...'kerana kekhuatiran mereka itu nampak luar biasa takutnya' - adakah ini asas mengapa soalan ini ditanya? MP sendiri tak ambil pendirian...adakah dia juga takut...atau hanya pekerja KTMB? 

- Ada banyak isu kini - kita tak tahu pun statistik di Jabatan Buruh? Berapa pekerja yang mengadu - Apakah aduan mereka? - Berapa pekerja yang mendadu diwakili peguam atau 'Unionist'? Berapa yang menang? Adakah mereka menerima bayaran perlu? Bila kerajaan akan mengubah undang-undang supaya majikan yang gagal membayar 'wang'(OT/Gaji/Dll) juga akan perlu membayar pekerja yang terpaksa susah pi Jabatan Sumber Manusia untuk dapatkan keadilan sekurang-kurangnya 2 kali ganda hutang tertunggak kepada pekerja...Kini, majikan tak bayar satu bulan gaji...pekerja pi mengadu, akhirnya bila pekerja menang - majikan diperintahkan membayar sahaja apa yang beliau harus bayar dahulu tetapi gagal...Ini langsung tak adil...

- Isu Mahkamah Perusahaan - kes pembuangan kerja secara salah Wan Noorulazhar - kini lebih kurang 6 tahun - tak pun tamat di Mahkamah Perusahaan...adilkah ini?

- Bilakah kerajaan akan buang peruntukkan 'rujuk kepada menteri' - dan benarkan pekerja terus membawa kes mereka ke Mahkamah Perusahaan? Proses 'Konsiliasi' di IRD tak perlu lagi kerana di Mahkamah Perusahaan kini selalu ada proses serupa - panggil "mediation' - usaha cuba mendapatkan majikan dan pekerja 'settle' - tak boleh, baru akan dibicarakan? 

- Statistik - berapa bilangan kes yang Menteri tak rujuk kepada Mahkamah Perusahaan?

- Bilakan kerajaan akan menghapuskan keperluan membayar KOS di Mahkamah Tinggi dan seterusnya bila ia merupakan kes pekerja dari Mahkamah Sumber Manusia atau Mahkamah Perusahaan?

- Kes Union Busting di Infineon - ini isu semasa - kenapa tak tanya? Kini Presiden Union tak dapat masuk pejabat union, atau melakukan tugas perlu dilakukan Presiden..

- Banyak soalan perlu tetapi MP Abdullah Sani tak tanya pun --- malas atau kurang keprihatinan?  

- Sekali lagi, soalan tak mengemukakan apa-apa cadangan - hanya tanya 'apakah jaminan' - tak ada cadangan sendiri - hanya tanya kerajaan? Yang ditanya adalah 'apakah jaminan pekerjaan' - bukah lebih baik tanya sama ada akan berlaku pembuangan pekerjaan atau 'retrenchment'...kerajaan boleh jawab, jika dibuang pun ada 'jaminan pekerjaan' lain di Malaysia...

- Soalan susulan MP biasanya patut lebih mendalam dan kritikal - tetapi di sini nampaknya soalan yang sama ...sebenarnya lebih sempit merujuk kepada RUM...apa jaminan yang perlu pun tak jelas? Soalan asal - 'menjejaskan pekerjaan' - adakah bercakap pasal kesan cara positif atau cara negatif..Bila ditanya kepada kerajaan mesti Jelas - kalau tidak mereka pandai 'tak jawab' atau akan bermain dengan jawapan...

- Kesimpulan - Soalan boleh diperbaiki lagi...Ada banyak lagi isu relevan semasa - mungkin sudahpun ditanya - kita lihat soalan lain di sesi ini..

Alangkah bagus jika MP ini juga meminta AWAL cadangan soalah daripada Union, para pekerja dan yang berminat isu hak pekerja... 


3. Dato’ Abdullah Sani bin Abdul Hamid [Kuala Langat] minta Menteri Sumber Manusia menyatakan berhubung Perjanjian "Railway Network Access Agreement" (RNAA) yang akan menjejaskan perkhidmatan pekerja-pekerja Keretapi Tanah Melayu Berhad (KTMB). Apakah jaminan pekerjaan kepada pekerja-pekerja KTMB sekiranya RNAA ditandatangani dan dilaksanakan.
 
Menteri Sumber Manusia [Dato’ Sri Richard Riot anak Jaem]: Terima kasih Yang Berhormat Kuala Langat, terima kasih Tuan Yang di-Pertua. RNAA adalah satu perjanjian di antara Keretapi Tanah Melayu Berhad (KTMB) dengan Perbadanan Aset Keretapi (Railway Asset Corporation). Perjanjian RNAA ini berada di bawah bidang kuasa Kementerian Pengangkutan. Berhubung dengan isu sama ada RNAA ini memberi kesan atau sebaliknya kepada pekerja KTMB, setakat ini pihak kementerian tidak menerima apa-apa aduan melibatkan penamatan pekerja di KTMB kesan daripada RNAA.
 
Sekiranya ia memberi kesan kepada pekerja, peruntukan undang-undang yang berkaitan mestilah dipatuhi. Mana-mana pekerja yang mendakwa majikan telah gagal mematuhi peruntukan undang-undang sedia ada, mereka boleh membuat aduan mengenainya kepada pihak kementerian iaitu melalui jabatan-jabatan yang ada di bawah kementerian, Jabatan Perhubungan Perusahaan dan Jabatan Tenaga Kerja. Sekian, terima kasih.

■1020
Dato’ Abdullah Sani bin Abdul Hamid [Kuala Langat]: Terima kasih Tuan Yang di-Pertua. Yang Berhormat Menteri, pada 16 Mac 2013, Timbalan Menteri Pengangkutan bila menyentuh tentang pekerja-pekerja KTMB, dia ada berkata akan dipertimbangkan. Persoalannya ialah apakah implikasinya dan jaminan terhadap Persatuan Pekerja-pekerja Keretapi Tanah Melayu Berhad iaitu RUM setelah RNAA ini ditandatangani? Jaminan yang hendak— kerana kekhuatiran mereka itu nampak luar biasa takutnya. Terima kasih Tuan Yang di-Pertua.
 
Dato’ Sri Richard Riot anak Jaem: Tuan Yang di-Pertua, untuk menjawab kepada soalan yang telah diajukan oleh Yang Berhormat Kuala Langat, harus diingatkan bahawa dua taklimat telah pun diadakan iaitu taklimat-taklimat khas, satu yang telah diadakan khas untuk Majlis Eksekutif Kesatuan Pekerja-pekerja KTMB dan keduanya yang telah diadakan pada 10 Januari, taklimat khas Railway Network kepada Kesatuan Pekerja KTMB.
 
Jadi menjawab kepada soalan yang telah diajukan, ia perlu dilihat dari pelbagai perspektif. Antaranya, sama ada selepas RNAA ditandatangani, syarikat sedia ada masih kekal, diambil alih sepenuhnya atau sebahagian oleh syarikat baru yang sama atau berbeza entiti dengan syarikat yang sedia ada. Oleh yang demikian, Railway Union Malaya (RUM) perlu merujuk semula soalan ini kepada kementerian setelah RNAA telah ditandatangani dan persoalan mengenai status syarikat yang akan menjalankan operasi telah diketahui.
 
Dalam pada ini, kita sedang melihat sama ada kesannya negatif terhadap para pekerja. Saya telah menyebut dalam jawapan saya sebentar tadi bahawa ini adalah di bidang kuasa Ministry of Transport.
 
Tuan Yang di-Pertua: Terima kasih. Oleh sebab tidak ada soalan tambahan kedua kepada Menteri, maka sesi MQT pada hari ini berakhir. - Hansard 21/3/2017, Portal Rasmi Parlimen Malaysia


55 Groups - INFINEON MUST STOP UNION BUSTING AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST UNION LEADERS - Reinstate Union President?

 

Sunday, March 5, 2017

KESATUAN SEKERJA INDUSTRI ELEKTRONIK WILAYAH BARAT SEMENANJUNG MALAYSIA v. RENESAS SEMICONDUCTOR KL SDN BHD (2016) - Union Busting?

Union Busting Case - But why no order for damages and/or compensations? To be discussed later...
  KESATUAN SEKERJA INDUSTRI ELEKTRONIK WILAYAH BARAT SEMENANJUNG MALAYSIA v. RENESAS SEMICONDUCTOR KL SDN BHD INDUSTRIAL COURT, KUALA LUMPUR MARY SHAKILA G AZARIAH;   EMPLOYERS' PANEL: ABDULALIM ZAKARIA;   EMPLOYEES' PANEL: PREM KUMAR APPUKUTTY AWARD NO. 244 OF 2016 [CASE NO: 22/3-733/13] 8 MARCH 2016
AWARD
(NO. 244 of 2016)


Mary Shakila G Azariah:

[1] This reference pertains to a trade dispute between Kesatuan Sekerja Industri Elektronik Wilayah Barat Semenanjung Malaysia (hereinafter referred to as "the union") and Renesas Semiconductor KL Sdn. Bhd. (hereinafter referred to as "the company").

Brief Facts

[2] This is a reference made by the Honourable Minister of Human Resources under s. 8(2A) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967. The reference arose out of a complaint of union Busting against the company for violations of ss. 4(1), 4(2), 4(3), and 5(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967. In May 2009 the Government of Malaysia had approved the unionisation of the workmen in the electronics industry. The Director-General of Trade Unions approved the registration of the workmen in the electronics industry into 4 regions. A pro-tem committee was formed for the registration of those workmen employed in the electronics industry and Wan Noorulazhar bin Mohd. Hanafiah, an employee of the company, was elected as its pro-tem President. Wan Noorulazhar contends that sometime in November 2009 he was called by the Plant Director of the company and told that he was not to promote the establishment of a national/regional wide union for the electronics industry and told that the company will very soon be promoting an Union. He was told to cooperate with Zulkifly Abdul Rahman who was then the Division Manager, Human Resource General Admin Department to facilitate the establishment of the in-house union.

[3] It is contended that Wan Noorulazhar replied that employees were free to form trade unions and that employers ought not to interfere with Union activities. It is contended that Goh Kwang Whung, the company's Plant Director issued a veiled threat to Wan Noorulazahar to concentrate on his work to safeguard his future in the company and to allow Zulkifly Abdul Rahman to establish the in-house union. Nevertheless the Union was established and was registered as the Kesatuan Sekerja Industri Elektronik Wilayah Barat Semenanjung Malaysia on 1 December 2009 and it submitted a claim for recognition from the Company on 18 January 2010. The company vide its letter dated 8 February 2010 refused to grant recognition to the union.

[4] It is alleged that sometime in March 2010 the company arranged for members of the Joint Consultative Committee (JCC) in the company to be brought to Cyberview Resort & Spa to attend a seminar on the setting up of an in-house union. The said seminar was conducted by the official from the Malaysian Employers Federation.

[5] It is alleged that sometime in May 2010 Loh Kuei Wah an officer of the company met Wan Noorulazhar and offered him the post of President of the in-house union and to send him for a course on collective agreements and requested him to encourage other employees to join the in-house union. Wan Noorulazhar declined the said offer. It is alleged that he was told that he was at the risk of being dismissed and that the union's claim for recognition from the company was a futile effort. Wan Noorulazhar alleges that thereafter he was moved from his normal work and shift and placed in cold storage only to perform tasks that was below his job grade as a Chargeman and his movements were closely monitored by the Human Resource Department even by the installation of CCTV.

[6] Sometime in July 2010 it is alleged that Romanza bin Ramli a Shop Steward in the union and employed as a Senior Technician in the company was approached by Loh Kuei Wah to discuss with the other shop stewards to request that the union withdraw its claim for recognition so as to enable the in-house union to secure recognition from the company. It was said that Romanza bin Ramli was told that union will never get its recognition as the company was working closely with the IR Department.

[7] It is the union's contention that sometime in August 2010 Mohd. Saizol bin Othman a colleague of Wan Noorulazhar was approached by the new Manager of FMD Department and told not to associate with Wan Noorulazhar and the union and to only join the in-house union. It is averred that sometime in January and February 2011 Loh Kuei Wah again requested Wan Noorulazhar to withdraw the union's claim for recognition. Special incentives were paid out sometime in April 2011 to certain categories of employees but not to active shop stewards of the union and Wan Noorulazhar. Chargemen in the company were promoted except for Wan Noorulazhar who in fact was dismissed with effect from 26 August 2011 after a domestic inquiry for a Charge that was allegedly without basis. Pursuant to s. 9 of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 a secret ballot was conducted to ascertain what percentage of workers employed by the company were members of the union and it was declared that 72.69% were members of the union by the IR Department.

[8] It is the contention of the union that the company had taken steps in contravention of ss. 4(1), 4(2), 4(3) and 5(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 without proper cause. It prays that the Industrial Court finds that the Company has contravened these sections and orders the company to pay Wan Noorulazhar the amount of wages lost from the date of dismissal to l -2 the date of Hearing of this reference or final date determined by this Honorable Court.

[9] The company denies that it has contravened ss. 4(1), 4(2), 4(3) and 5(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967. The company alleges that it had no knowledge of the registration of the union and that Wan Noorulazhar its employee had been elected as the Pro-Tem President of the said union. It is contended that it came to know that Wan Noorulazhar was its President when a claim for recognition was signed by him in his capacity as President which was served on the company on 18 January 2010. The company alleges that following the announcement by the government of Malaysia approving the unionisation of the electronics industry on a regional basis the company had formed the intention of forming an in-house union and had discussions with the Joint Consultative Committee within the company towards that end. The company states that at the material time the company had no knowledge that the union was working towards registration of its establishment and claiming recognition from the company. It is the company's allegations that as part of its initiative in educating employers on trade unionism the Malaysian Employers Federation had held a briefing on 10 November 2009. It is the company's allegation that union's claim for recognition vide Form A was served on the company on 18 January 2010 and was declared null and void for non-compliance of the Industrial Relations Regulations 2009. It is its contention that a fresh claim for recognition was made by the union on 6 September 2011. It is contended by the company that the seminar at the Cyberview Resort & Spa was to educate members of the JCC on the Trade Union Act as a whole and not on in-house unionism. It-is its contention that special incentives-were-paid-to employees who earned it including Wan Noorulazhar. It states that it had no knowledge as to which of its employees were shop stewards of the union and which were not. The company denies any insinuation and allegation of victimisation against Wan Noorulazhar and states that the promotion of chargemen in the company was dependent on whether the relevant chargemen had passed the relevant examinations and acquired the necessary qualification for promotion as a chargeman.

[10] It is the company's contention that Wan Noorulazhar was dismissed on 26 August 2011 after a domestic inquiry had found him guilty of a misconduct that is that he had maligned the company publicly online through his Facebook page.

Evidence, Evaluation And Findings

The Union's

[11] The union's first witness, UW1 was the General-Secretary of the Electronic Industry Employee's Union - Western Region Peninsular Malaysia, which is the Union in this matter. He testified that sometime thereabout May 2009 the Government of Malaysia had approved the unionisation of the workmen of the electronics industry. He testified that thereafter the Director-General of Trade Unions approved the registration of the workmen in the electronics industry into 4 regions. He testified that a pro-tem committee for the registration of a union of those workmen employed in the electronics industry was formed and Wan Noorulazhar bin Mohd. Hanafiah, the company's employee, was elected as the pro-tem president.

[12] UW1 testified that he was informed by Wan Noorulazhar that the company's Plant Director, Goh Kwang Whung ("Goh") questioned him sometime in early 2009 about the activities of the Union and for him to seek advise of Zulkifli Abdul Rahman when was then the Division Manager, Human Resource General Admin Department for requirements on establishing an union. He said that Goh requested Wan Noorulazhar not to promote the establishment of a national/regional-wide union for the electronics industry and that the company will very soon be promoting an establishment (in-house) union and when Wan Noorulazhar refused to do so he issued a veiled threat to him to concentrate on his work to safeguard his future in the company. He further testified that on 12 November 2009 Loh Kuei Wah ("Loh") met with Mohd. Nazri bin Jahuri another employee of the company and prior to that meeting Loh had offered him to lead the in-house union that was being established by the company as the company had come to know of the establishment of the union. He testified that Mohd. Nazri declined the said offer.

[13] UW1 testified that the union was registered as Kesatuan Sekerja Industri Elektronik Wilayah Barat Semenanjung Malaysia on 1 December 2009 and was permitted to receive as members those workmen employed in the electronics industry located in the States of Selangor, Wilayah Persekutuan and Perak. It was his evidence that he was aware that the union submitted a claim for recognition on 8 January 2010 to the company. He testified that the company refused to recognise the union. He testified that the company sometime in March 2010 arranged for the members of the Joint Consultative Committee (JCC) in the company to attend a seminar on the setting up of an in-house union conducted by an Official from the Malaysian Federation of Employers at Cyberview Resort & Spa. It was his evidence that the JCC members who attended were advised to join the in-house union and Siti Jumiah Md. Ful and Roziah bt. Karim who attended the said seminar were encouraged by Zulkifly Abdul Rahman and Loh to lead the in-house union. He testified that under the guidance and influence of Loh and/or Zulkifly Abdul Rahman, Siti Jumiah Md. Ful, Roziah bt. Karim, Zakaria bin Deraman, Nurul Azira bt. Abd. Rahman and Julaidah bt. Pardi who were the principal pro-tem committee officials took steps to for the formation of an in-house union in the company.

[14] It was his evidence that he was informed by Wan Noorulazhar that sometime in May 2010 Loh met him again and offered him the post of president of the in-house union and to send him for a course on collective agreements and requested him to encourage other employees to join the in-house union. He testified that when Wan Noorulazhar refused and because he did not want to cooperate with the management he was told that his future the company was bleak and that he was at the risk of being dismissed. It was UW1's evidence that Wan Noorulazhar was informed by his immediate superior Sundramorgan on several occasions that he had no future in the company including promotions as the HR Department will pressure him to resign and if those efforts fail he will be dismissed for whatever reasons. It was his testimony that Wan Noorulazhar was moved from his normal work and shift and placed in cold storage only to perform task that was below his job grade as a chargeman and his movements were closely monitored by the HR Department even by the installation of CCTV.

[15] UW1 further testified that in July 2010 Romanza bin Ramli who was a shop steward in the union and employed as a Senior Technician in the company was approached by Loh to discuss with the other shop stewards to request the union to withdraw its claim for recognition and to replace the union to enable the in-house union to secure recognition from the company. He said that in exchange Romanza was offered the authority of appointing anyone in the company to be the leadership with him in the in-house union. He testified that sometime in August 2010 Mohd. Saizol bin Othman a colleague of Wan Noorulazhar was approached by the new Manager of FMD Department and told not to associate with Wan Noorulazhar and the Union and to only join the in-house union. He said that sometime in January 2011 Wan Noorulazhar was asked by Loh again to withdraw the union's claim for recognition and stating that it was easier for an in-house union to obtain recognition. He said that sometime in February 2011 the new Manager of FMD Department asked Wan Noorulazhar to withdraw the union's claim for recognition and if he did so there will be no more harassment discrimination in any form or victimisation on him. He testified that Wan Noorulazhar declined the offer.

[16] UW1 further testified that sometime in April 2011 the company paid out incentives to certain categories of the employees but not to the active shop stewards of the union and 1 Exco Member. He said Wan Noorulazhar was paid 6% out of a maximum of 12%. He testified that Wan Noorulazhar was denied promotion and was dismissed from the company on 26 August 2011 after a domestic inquiry found him guilty of misconduct that was without basis.

[17] It was UW1 testimony that in the light of the above mentioned actions the company had violated ss. 4(1), 4(2), 4(3) and 5(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 without proper cause and the fundamental rights of the Union which was seeking to improve working conditions for the workmen in the company. It was his testimony that the company exercised managerial powers in furtherance of unfair labour practice depriving the members of the union of their freedom of association and their fundamental rights enshrined in the Federal Constitution. He said that despite several letters by the pro-tem committee of the in-house union the Director-General of Trade Unions (DGTU) had refused to register the in-house union and the pro-tem committee of the in-house union initiated judicial review proceedings at the High Court against the decision of the DGTU to register the said in-house union and to the Court of Appeal as the High Court had dismissed their application. It was his evidence that the appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal as well.

[18] UW1 testified that on 6 September 2011 the union sought recognition from the company again and the company declined to accord recognition. He said that the union reported the matter to the Director- General of Industrial Relations and also complained that the company had breached ss. 4(1), 4(2), 4(3) and 5(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967. He testified that pursuant to s. 9 of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 a secret ballot was carried out and it showed that 72.69% of the workmen employed by the company were members of the Union and that the union had thus established the requirements to be accorded recognition. It was his testimony that the company filed an application for judicial review at the High Court dissatisfied with the Minister of Human Resources order recognising the union.

[19] It was his evidence when cross-examined that he had no personal knowledge of the incidents and facts he narrated in court and that what he testified was based on what was told to him by Wan Noorulazhar and other employees of the company.

[20] UW2 the union's second witness testified that he was the president of the union. He testified that the union was registered on 11 February 2009 and that its Secretary-General was UW1. It was his evidence that vide its letter dated 16 February 2012 the union complained about the activities of the Company which were in violation of ss. 4(1), 4(2), 4(3) and 5(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967. He testified that in early November 2009 he was asked by Goh Kwang Whung the Company's Plant Director (Goh) about the developments of the Union and had asked him to seek advise from Zulkifly Abdul Rahman (Zulkifly). He said that he was asked by Goh to not spread news about the Union among its employees as the Company intended to set up an in-house union and asked him to work with Zulkifly in the setting up of the in-house union. He said that he told Goh that it was a worker's right to form an Union and that he cannot be influenced by the company. He testified that he was told by Goh then to concentrate on his work so as to preserve his position in the company. He further testified that on 12 November 2009 the Senior Manager in the Human Resource Department, Loh telephoned Mohd. Nazri bin Jahuri offering him membership in the in-house union that the company was intending to set up. He said that at 7.55 pm that same day Loh met Mohd. Nazri and during this meeting he rejected Loh's offer.

[21] UW2 testified further that on 8 January 2010 he signed Form A on behalf of the union seeking recognition of the union from the company. He testified that Loh vide his letter dated 8 February 2010 refused to accord recognition to the union. He testified that in the middle of May 2010 the company organised a seminar for employees who were members of the JCC at Cyberview Resort & Spa at Cyberjaya. He testified that the Company invited an official from Malaysian Federation of Employers to give a briefing to them on the formation of an in-house union. It was his evidence that Mohd. Ayob was one of the attendees at the said seminar together with Siti Jumiah bt. Md. Ful and Roziah bt. Karim who were involved in applying for the registration of the in-house union. It was his evidence that Loh met him in May 2010 at the Factory Maintenance Department (FMD). He said that he was advised by Loh to think hard about his future in the company and was asked to withdraw as President of the union and to take up membership in the in-house union that was to be formed. He said that Loh offered him to be the President of the said in-house union and to send him for a course in collective agreements. He testified that he was asked to invite his friends to follow him as well. He said that he again turned down the offer and requested Loh to respect the workers' rights. UW2 testified that he was taken a back when Loh told him that his future in the company looked bleak and that he was at the risk of being dismissed. UW2 further testified that Loh told him that applying for recognition of the union was an exercise in vain and that Zulkifly was close to the officer at JPP Putrajaya.

[22] UW2 testified that he was often told by his immediate supervisor, Sundramogan a/1 Murugan that he had no future in the company and that he will be harassed by the company and will be dismissed if he himself had not resigned. He testified that his promotion was frozen whilst his colleague Muhammad Suhaimi bin Dollah who was in the grade as him was given Certificate A4 and finished his course at ILSAS Bangi later than him. He testified that he was not given specific tasks as he was given prior to him being involved in the union. He said that he was only asked to do some odd jobs and assist the other chargemen. He said that he was no longer placed on shift duties but was told to commence normal working hours by the company. It was his evidence that the company installed CCTV cameras just next to his office as if they wanted to monitor his movements and to scare other employees who wanted to talk to him. He said that he was informed by Sundramorgan that the CCTV cameras was to monitor him.

[23] UW2 testified further that Romanza bin Ramli a Technician in the company and 1 of the shop stewards of the union was visited by Loh who asked him to discuss with the union to withdraw its claim for recognition and to replace it with the in-house union. He said that Loh promised him that if he and the other shop stewards agreed to his request they could determine who could lead the in-house union that was to be set up. He testified that Loh informed Romanza that their union will never get the recognition as they were working close with the JPP and that until Loh retires the union will never get the recognition sought. It was his evidence that because Romanza did not give Loh a reply he was transferred out. He testified that Romanza was discriminated against by the company and his movements were monitored.

[24] It was his evidence that in July 2010 his new Department Manager/General Manager Vijendran a/1 Seevaratnam met him and discussed his future in the company with him. He testified that he was given a choice that if he continued to be active in the union he had no future in the company and if he chose to be a part of the in-house union his future in the company would be bright. He said that he was asked to think about his family if he was to be dismissed.

[25] UW2 testified that his colleague, Mohd Saizol bin Othman was told by Vijendran sometime in August 2010 not to participate in the union and to become a member of the in-house union. He said that Mohd. Saizol was told not to follow him as he had no future in the company. It was his evidence that throughout the month of January 2011, Loh telephoned him asking him to not be active in the union as the union's claim for recognition will not succeed. He said that he was asked by Loh to cancel the union's application for recognition and to give up my position in the union and to follow the company's decision to set up the in-house union. He said that he was then asked by Vijendran to cancel the union's claim for recognition and to assist the company set up the in-house union. It was his evidence that in April 2011 he and other shop stewards were discriminated against by the company when special incentive payments were paid out. It was his evidence that he was paid 6% out of a maximum of 12% whist his colleagues were paid none. He said that in July 2011 he was again discriminated against when the company denied him a promotion when the other chargemen received theirs. It was his evidence that on 1 August 2011 Sundramorgan told him that he was to be dismissed at anytime and therefore asked him to hand over his work. It was his testimony that he was eventually dismissed on 26 August 2011.

[26] UW2 testified that he was dismissed for not cooperating with the company and failing to withdraw from the union. He said that the company's intention was to paralyse the union and to threaten other members of the union so that they too would think of leaving the union.

[27] It was the evidence of UW3, Technical Assistance with the company, that on 12 November 2009 he met Loh and rejected his earlier offer to him to become a member of the in-house union that was to be set up. He said that Loh had informed him that the company was aware of the unions's move to obtain recognition and the company was intending to set up an in-house union. It was his evidence that he recorded the said conversation with his handphone but could not reproduce the same as it was done some 5 years ago and that his handphone no longer functions.

[28] UW4, a Technical Assistant with the company, testified that he was aware that the JCC was set up in the company and that he was involved in it. It was his testimony that he attended the seminar that was sponsored by the company at Cyberview Resort & Spa in 2010 together with, inter alia, Puan Siti Jumiah another member of the JCC. He testified that he informed UW2 what was discussed at the said seminar viz that the representative from Malaysian Employers Federation and the company's representatives present at the said seminar attempted to influence them to join the in-house union. It was his evidence that Loh and Zulkifly Abdul Rahman both from the Human Resource Department, were at the said seminar. He testified that they were told about the advantages of joining an in-house union and the disadvantages of joining the union.

[29] UW5, a senior Technician with the company at the material time, testified that he had informed UW2 that Loh had spoken to him in 2010 asking him to ask the union to withdraw or cancel its claim for recognition so that the in-house union could be set up. He testified that Loh had told him to treat this matter seriously and if he did then he and his other shop stewards could decide who should lead and be shop steward in the in-house union that was to be set up. He said that Loh said that if they did not compromise it will be a loss because the union will never obtain its recognition as the officials of the JPP were working with the company to hinder this. It was his evidence that because he did not give Loh a reply to this he was transferred out without prior discussion or his consent to another department. He said that he was not allowed to do overtime and his movements were monitored by the company closely. He said that he felt pressured and was told by his superior that this was the company's orders that he be monitored.

[30] The last witness of the union, UW6, a Technician with the company at the material time, testified that he had informed UW2 that in August 2010 Vijendran his supervisor had asked him not to participate in the union and to join the in-house union instead. He testified that Vijendran had also told him that he was to not follow UW2 as UW2 had no future in the company as he refuses to give up his activities of the union and join the in-house union that is sponsored by the company.

The Company's

[31] The company's 1st witness, COW1, the Industrial Relations and General Administration Manager in the Human Resources and General Administration Department of the company, testified that the union served the company with their claim for recognition on 6 September 2011. He testified that the accusations against the company were baseless and denied them. He testified that the company had good relationship with its workers and that they had in existence a JCC comprising of 6 management representative and 16 employee representative from each group of employees and shifts. It was his evidence that on 8 November 2009 he received from Siti Jumiah binti Md. Ful who was the pro-tem secretary stating the intention to establish an in-house union and asked for the company's consent to use its address as their correspondence address. He testified that this is all he knew. He testified that he had no knowledge of the fact that Siti Jumiah challenged-the DGTU's refusal to register the said in-house union and had filed the application in court. COW1 testified that he was not aware that the in-house union had filed their application for registration as he was not provided with or given a copy of the in-house union's said application. It was his evidence that he did not know who the members of the pro-tem committee members were save for Siti Jumiah.

[32] It was his testimony that he did not know when the regional union had submitted its application for registration. He said that he only became aware of the existence of the Regional Union when a claim for recognition was served on the company on 18 January 2010 and that UW2 had become its President. He testified that this claim by the union for recognition was declared null and void by the Industrial Relations Department as it did not comply with the then newly introduced Industrial Relations Regulations 2009. It was his evidence that the Regional Union subsequently made another claim for recognition on 6 September 2011.

[33] He denied that he met Mohd. Nazri bin Jahuri and that the company did not establish the in-house union. It was his evidence that the Seminar arranged by the company Cyberview was to educate the JCC members on the relevant laws on Trade Unionism and not on the formation of in-house union. He testified that the accusations against him that he met Wan Noorulazhar in May 2010 offering him the post of president of the in-house union was false as the post had been taken up by Zakaria bin Deraman. He denied that he made any threats to Wan Noorulazhar as regards his future in the company. He further denied that he met Romanza in July 2010 and asking him to request the other shop stewards to request that the union withdrew their claim for recognition so that the in-house union could be recognised. He testified that he did not offer Romanza to lead the in-house union. He also denied that he met Wan Noorulazhar in January 2011 asking him to withdraw the union's claim for recognition as there was no pending claim for recognition in the first place. He testified that active shop stewards and Wan Noorulazhar were not discriminated against when incentive payments were paid out by the company. It was his testimony that Wan Noorulazhar was in fact paid the incentive. COW1 testified further that Wan Noorulazhar was dismissed for gross misconduct as he had made false and irresponsible statements on social media against the company so as to incite employees to go against the company.

[34] When he was cross-examined COW1 testified that efforts were made in 2010 to establish an in-house union and that the company was aware by March 2010 that the Regional Union for electronics Workmen had been established. He agreed when the names of some of the attendees at the Seminar arranged by the company at Cyberview were members of the Pro-tem Committee of the in-house union. He denied however when it was put to him that the said seminar was arranged for them. When it was read out from the Statement In Reply and put to him by the union's counsel COW1 agreed that it was the company's intention to form the in-house union. He agreed when it was put to him that the company refused to recognise the Union when the claim was submitted to him and that by a secret ballot carried by the Industrial Relations Department 72.69% of eligible workers from the company voted in favour of the union and the Honourable Minister directed the company to accord recognition to it.

[35] It was COWl's testimony that he was seen with some of the pro-tem committee members at the Industrial Relations Department by UW1 and agreed that he walked out quickly when he was seen. He denied leveling threats at Wan Noorulazhar or meeting him in 2010 and 2011. He denied that he told Wan Noorulazhar, Industrial Relations Officer, that he knew Kamal Pardi and that he will delay the recognition sought by the regional Union. He agreed that this Kamal Pardi was the signatory to the official letter from the Industrial Relations Department stating that the union's claim for recognition was defective. When asked about the installation of the CCTVs in the company he said that they were installed way before 2009 to safeguard the company's precious metal and not to monitor Wan Noorulazhar's movements. He testified that he was not aware that Wan Noorulazhar was overlooked for promotion. He disagreed that the company had taken steps to bust the union in contravention of the Federal Constitution.

[36] The company's 2nd witness, COW2, testified that UW2 was given the incentive that meant that his salary was increased by 6%. He testified that some of the employees under him were not given the incentive by the company as they were under-performers. He testified that he did not know whether these named employees were shop stewards and members of the regional union. It was his testimony that the said incentive was given to those who performed well and had nothing to do with whether they were members or active in the union. He testified that he did not know who the union's shop stewards were.

[37] It was his evidence when cross-examined that he was not involved in the incentive pay out to UW2. When asked he said that he had no documents before the court to show that the named individuals who did not receive the incentive were poor performers.

[38] COW3 the company's 3rd witness denied that he advised UW2 to not tell the other employees of the company about the formation of the union and that at anytime the Human Resources Department could take action against him. In cross-examination he testified that he attended the seminar at the Cyberview on 16 March 2010. It was his evidence that the seminar was about Understanding Industrial Relations. He denied when it was put to him that it was also about formation of an in-house union. He maintained when cross-examined by the union's counsel that he did not speak to UW2 about not talking to his colleagues about union issues.

[39] COW4, the General Manager cum Department Manager of the Factory Maintenance Department (FMD) at the material time testified that he did not meet UW2 as alleged by him and gave him a choice of continuing as the President of the union in which case he would not have a future with the company or assist and cooperate with the company in the formation of the in-house union and would have then a bright future. He denied that he told UW2 that Encik Zulkifly Abdul Rahman would guarantee his future would be bright in the company and that these were the instructions and decision of the Management. He testified that he did not tell UW2 to think long and hard whether he wanted to continue his employment with the company or not and to think about his wife and children and the consequences if he lost his job. He testified that he did not tell UW2 that he could talk this out with Encik Zulkifly Abdul Rahman. It was his evidence that he did not meet UW2 sometime in February 2011 to discuss union issues or having requested UW2 to take the win situation by canceling the registration of the union and to go with the company on the establishment of the in-house union. He testified that he did not tell UW2 that if he did this the victimisation and the freezing of his promotion will cease. COW4 testified that he did not meet UW2 in April 2011 and denied telling him that some employees and those active in the union will not be eligible for the special incentive given by the company asking him again to choose whether he will follow the company and withdraw as President of the union and if he did so he could be given up to 12% as a special incentive.

[40] COW4 further testified that he did not meet Mohd. Saizol bin Othman and told him not to join the union but to join the in-house union approved by the company. He denied that he had told him that if he followed UW2 he too would have no future in the company.

[41] It was his evidence when cross-examined by the union's counsel that he could not remember meeting UW2 in July 2010 but testified that he did not meet UW2 with regards to his union matters. It was his evidence that he did not receive any directive from COW1 or Zulkifly to tell UW2 and UW6 to remove themselves from the union and to get involved in the in-house union. COW4 maintained that he did not meet UW2 in February 2011.

[42] The company's final witness, COW5 testified that at the material time he was UW2's supervisor. He denied that he had frequently told UW2 that he had no future in the company and the company was victimising him so that he would made to resign on his own. He denied that he told UW2 that if he did not deny the company would dismiss him on grounds of misconduct. He testified that he did not tell UW2 that his promotions will be frozen by the company nor did he verify that UW2 did not get his promotion because he was the President of the union. It was his testimony that he also did not tell UW2 that he ought to be careful and that his movements were being watched through the CCTV and that he was not given specific work as the company intended to kill his career in the company. COW5 testified that he did not meet UW2 on 1 August 2011 or tell him that not to say anything to anyone but to be ready to be dismissed at anytime and that it was the decision of the Human Resources Department of the company.

[43] It was his evidence when cross-examined that he was aware that the regional union was set up and that the company was not happy with it operating within its premises. He admitted that he was aware that UW2 was the President of the said regional union. He denied when it was put to him that he told UW2 not to be involved in the said union.

The Court's Evaluation

[44] The Honourable Minister has referred this dispute involving the union and the company as a case of "union busting". The term "union busting" as we know it to be is a term used to describe a wide range of activities undertaken to disrupt or prevent the formation of a Trade Union. Union busting tactics can refer to both legal and illegal activities and can range anywhere from subtle to violent. It is trite enshrined in the Federal Constitution that the right to form or join a union. It includes, inter alia the right to help organise, to join and to support a union of your choosing. It includes also and is not limited to such activities as talking to other employees about the union, passing out literature and one cannot be punished for his own union activity. Most employers do not want their employees to be in a union. Think about it; employers go from having to share power with workers who stand together. From their perspective organised workers will cost more money and require that they follow a legally binding contract when before they could do it however they wanted. So when employees show interest in organising a union the company responds with an anti-union program. These union-avoidance programs serve to impede union organising. Sometimes they are legal restrictions on specific actions. Union-busting tactics range from urging employees to try and influence others to oppose union and tantamounts to a violation of law protecting the right to organise a union. Often the employer may resort to threatening supporters through third party and taking of actions that adversely affect an employee's job because of union activities. It may also consists in discriminating against union supporters when assigning desirable work or overtime work. It is observed that a disturbing union-busting trend is emerging whereby employers have been terminating, suspending and taking disciplinary actions against Trade Union leaders and members and workers involved in legitimate Trade Union and workers activities. Over the years we hear and see workers being terminated and/or disciplined by reason of their involvement in Union activities. Workers are compelled to attend one-on-one sessions with supervisors where workers are often harassed because of their involvement in union campaigns.

[45] It is said that a campaign against a union is an assault on individuals and a war on truth. As such it is a war without honour. The only way to bust a union is to lie, distort, manipulate, threaten and always, always attack. Employers adopt union busting tactics that include coercion, intimidation and retaliation to discourage from joining union.

[46] Our laws are well-defined within the Industrial Relations Act 1967 (IR Act) and Trade Unions Act 1959. Section 5 of the IR Act places a prohibition on employers and their Trade Unions in respect of certain acts. The section inter alia protects the termination, taking of disciplinary action or discriminating against union members. Section 59 of the IR Act states amongst other things that an employer cannot threaten an employee's position for his involvement in a Trade Union whilst s. 4 of the IR Act which shall be discussed in greater detail hereinafter prohibits the interference by the employer of a workman's rights to form and assist in the formation of and joining of a Trade Union and to participate in its lawful activities.

[47] The union's complaint in this case is that the company has by its actions contravened s. 4(1) and (3) and ss. 5(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the IR Act. They complained that the company has engaged in union-busting actions. The burden is on the union to prove that the company has indeed violated s. 4(3) and ss. 5(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the IR Act. Has it discharged its burden on a balance of probabilities?

Section 4(1)

[48] No person shall interfere with, restrain or coerce a workman or an employer in the exercise of his rights to form and assist in the formation of and join a Trade Union to participate in its lawful activities.

[49] It is trite that the burden is on the union to prove there was interference, restraint, or coercion from the company against the workmen's right to form and assist in the formation of and joining a Trade Union and participating in its lawful activities. The union narrated through its witnesses a chronology of events that was put in place by the company through its officers after the establishment of the Electronic Industry Employees' Union-Western Region Peninsular Malaysia which is the union in this matter. This was approved sometime in May 2009 by the Government of Malaysia and a pro-tem committee according to the evidence of UW1 was set up for the registration of a union of those workmen employed in the electronics industry and UW2 was elected as its President on 31 July 2009. These facts are not in dispute.

[50] It is alleged that UW2 was asked by Goh Kwang Whung sometime in 2009 not to promote the establishment of a national/regional wide union for the electronics industry and was told to concentrate on his work to safeguard his future in the company. Unfortunately Goh Kwang Whung did not testify on behalf of the company. His evidence to this extent was not rebutted by the company. COW1 denied the allegations that he telephoned UW3 prior to 12 November 2009 offering him to lead the in-house union that was formed. COW1 denied that he met UW4 in July 2010 as alleged requesting him and other shop stewards to call for the Union's withdrawal of its claim for recognition so as to enable the in-house union to secure registration. COW1 denied telling him that he could appoint anyone to be in leadership with him in the in-house union. COW1 also denied that he met UW2 in January 2011 where it is alleged that he requested him to withdraw the union's claim for recognition and saying it was easier to register an in-house union. COW4 denied that he approached UW6 telling him that he was not to associate himself with UW2 and the union and to join the in-house union.

[51] The union alleged that the active shop stewards and UW2 were not given special incentives that was given to the other workmen by the company. This was denied by the company. The company adduced evidence to show that UW1 received a special incentive of 6% raise in his salary, and that this was handled by the Human Resources Department and was based on performance as per COW2's evidence. COW2 also said that he did not know who the shop stewards were.

[52] The union further alleges that the seminar organized by the company at Cyberview Resort and Spa in March 2010 was in essence for the leadership of the in-house union to educate them on how to set it up. This was refuted by the company's witness during the Hearing.

[53] Likewise the allegations that COW3, COW4 and COW5 met with UW2 at different times and had made specific requests and representations to him about his involvement in the union and his future in the company are denied by them. Supervisors are usually the front line troops against the union delivering informal chats and speeches.

[54] This then is the scenario and the difficulty that the court faces. The chronology of events that the union alleges took place were designed to interfere, with, restrain or coerce UW2 and the remaining the other witnesses who testified from joining the union and/or participating in the lawful activities of the union. These actions if established by the union will tantamount to a clear-cut violation of s. 4(1) by the company. Taking into consideration the other acts of the company which I shall deal with a little later as we consider the other complains of the union, the court is of the view that the company's witnesses, all still serving in the employ of the company, are not to be believed. To state it slightly differently the court is satisfied with the veracity of the union's witnesses and their evidence some of whom are still employed by the company and have risked their jobs to testify against the company. The court is aware that in its Statement In Reply the company had pleaded that after becoming aware that the unionization of the electronics industry on a regional basis had been approved by the Government of Malaysia it had formed the intention of forming an in-house union and had discussions with the JCC within the company. The JCC was described as a body which served as the bridge between the employees and the Management. This pleaded fact does not augur well for the company and throws open for interpretation whether from thence onwards they were going to indulge in any union-avoidance activities and the complaints of what the management did after that, leveled by the union, perhaps is suggestive of this. UW2 was terminated by the company subsequently. This is manifestly a union-busting tactic and a violation of s. 5(1)(d) of the IR Act 1967 that protects the termination, disciplinary action or discrimination against union members if there is no just cause for his termination. Weighing them side by side each other is enough for the court to conclude that certain findings of fact that the company had indulged in union-busting tactics and has violated s. 4(1) of the IR Act 1967 which prohibits the interference, restrain or coercion of any workman in participating in the lawful activities of a Trade Union. The union's counsel conceded that the union's complaint was limited to this limb of s. 4(1). Hence it is the court's finding that on the evidence before it the company has by its activities through its troopers that is COW1, COW3, COW4 and COW5 indulged in union-avoidance tactics violating s. 4(1) of the IRA 1967. The court is satisfied based on the evidence before it that the company embarked on a planned course of action to stop UW2 and the other workers testifying at the Hearing from establishing a union already in the making. This is why they refused to grant recognition to the union when they first submitted a claim for recognition from the company vide Form A on 18 January 2010. The timing of the seminar that was held at Cyberview Resort and Spa in March 2010 leaves a lot to be said as to the motives of the company in organising the same.

Section 4(3)

[55] This section states that no employer amongst others shall support any Trade Union of workmen by financial or other means with the object of placing it under the control or influence of it. The union complains that the company has supported the formation of the in-house union in violation of this section. The union witnesses testified that the company organized a seminar at Cyberview Resort & Spa in March 2010 for the said JCC. The union witnesses testified that this seminar was for the leadership of the in-house union to educate them on how to set up the in-house union. The union witnesses showed that some of the attendees of this seminar were members of the pro-tem committee of the in-house union to be set up. This is too much of a coincidence I must say and coupled with their averment at paragraph 6 of their Statement In Reply in that the company had already formed that intention of forming an in-house union following the announcement by the Government of Malaysia approving the unionisation of electronics industry on a regional basis the only inference that the court can draw from its actions is that the company supported the very least the formation of the in-house union. The union witnesses testified that these attendees at the said seminar who were the pro-tem committee members of the in-house union went on to make an application for judicial review at the High Court when the registration of the in-house union was refused by the Director-General of Trade Unions. This is the court's findings based on the evidence before it and also being told that COW1 was seen with the said pro-tem committee members (pro-tem committee was formed on 7 November 2009) of the in-house union at the Trade Union Office. Again it is too much of a coincidence that COW1 is seen with these pro-tem committee members of the in-house union and his explanation that he happened to be there and was guiding them is rejected by the court as the court finds it to be implausible. Given the facts and evidence it would not be wrong for the court to conclude that the COW1 was supporting the formation of the in-house union and this is in violation of s. 4(3). The word "support" encompasses the giving of assistance, encouragement or approval to or to be actively interested in. Although their claim for recognition was rejected subsequently the circumstantial evidence surrounding the facts of this case points to the Company having supported and encouraged the formation of the in-house union. This is in gross violation of s. 4(3).

Section 5(1)(d)(i) And (ii)

[56] No employer or Trade Union of employers and no person acting on behalf of an employer or such Trade Union shall:


(d) dismiss or threaten to dismiss a workman, injure or threaten to injure him in his employment or alter or threaten to alter his position to his prejudice by reason that the workman


(1) is or proposes to become or seeks to become, or seeks to persuade any other person to become a member or officer of a Trade Union: or

(2) participates in the promotion, formation or activities of a Trade Union.

[57] The union witness, UW2 testified that COW1 met him in May 2010 and had told him that if he did not cooperate his future looked bleak and that he was at the risk of being dismissed. UW2 testified that COW5, his superior, on several occasions had intimated to him that he had no future in the company including promotions as the HR Department of the company will pressure him to resign and if this fail he will be dismissed by the company. UW2 further testified that in February 2011 he met COW4 who requested him to cooperate with the HR Department for a win-win situation by withdrawing the claim for recognition by the Union and that there would be no more harassment or victimization against him. All these allegations were denied by them. The evidence bear out that UW2 was by-passed for promotion as a Chargeman in his department and the special incentive paid out to him was 6% when the maximum received by other workers were 12%. His superiors testifying at the Hearing did not go on to talk about his performance as a Chargeman in the company. In fact the company did not lead evidence to establish him as having been a bad performer during his stay with the company at the material time. The company did not adduce evidence or defend UW2's claim against them that he was also sidelined, his shift taken away from him which shows that he was victimized since 2009 that is since his appointment as President of the said union. This is indeed an alteration of his position as a Chargeman to his prejudice. The company did not deny this and offered no explanation as to why they had embarked on this course of action against UW2. The dismissal of UW2 that followed suit thereafter has become the subject-matter of another action pending at the Industrial Court case number 12/4-83/12 where the company carries the burden of establishing that he (UW2) was dismissed for a just cause or excuse. I shall therefore stay clear of passing any comments on this lest I prejudice its outcome. Suffice to say that on the evidence before it is the court's findings that the company has violated s. 5(1)(d) in that it has carried out acts to injure or threaten to injure or alter or threaten to alter UW2 by reason that he has been active as a President and member of the union applying for its recognition and participating in its lawful activities.

Conclusion

[58] The court has made its ruling in accordance with equity, good conscience and having regard to the substantial merits of the case. The court notes that employers are lawfully bound to respect a worker's right to engage in unionism and to participate in the lawful activities of a union. The IR Act further makes the employer morally and ethically constrained to do so. Article 8 of the Code of Conduct for Industrial Harmony dated 9 February 1975 unequivocally declares, inter alia, that employers agree not to support or encourage any unfair labour practises such as interfering with the affairs of a Trade Union and the right of workers to organize, discriminate, restrain, or coerce against any worker because of legitimate Trade Union activities and abuse authority in any form.

[59] The protection of the right of the employees to unionise for their common good is stated in s. 4(1) of the IR Act 1967. On the evidence, facts and its pleaded case, the court finds that the company has violated the sections as pleaded by the union save for s. 4(2) which the union had withdrawn during its submissions in court. This is the court's final order.

Kesatuan Kebangsaan Pekerja-Pekerja Bank & Ors V. Ketua Pengarah Kesatuan Sekerja & Ors- Union membership after dismissal?



Kesatuan Kebangsaan Pekerja-Pekerja Bank & Ors V. Ketua Pengarah Kesatuan Sekerja & Ors
HIGH COURT MALAYA, KUALA LUMPUR
ALIZATUL KHAIR OSMAN J
[ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: R4(R2)-24-51-2008]
10 OCTOBER 2013

LABOUR LAW: Trade Union - Eligibility to membership - Whether a Trade Union member who has been dismissed from Employment remains a member pending final decision on challenge against dismissal - Industrial Relations Act 1967, s. 20 - Trade Unions Act 1959, s. 26(1A)

One Mr Solomon who was the General Secretary of the first plaintiff was dismissed from employment together with nine other members of the first plaintiff by CIMB Bank Berhad for unlawful picketing. Mr Solomon and the other members concerned challenged the dismissal and a representation was made to the Industrial Court pursuant to s. 20 of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 ('IRA'). The representation was heard by the Industrial Court, and the present originating summons was filed, pending the decision. According to the Director General of Trade Unions ('DGTU'), Mr Solomon was allowed to continue being a member of the first plaintiff and to stand for elections based on the view that Mr Solomon remained a workman as defined under the IRA until his representation to the Industrial Court on his dismissal was finally decided. However, the Attorney General's Chambers held the opposite view in relation to s. 26(1A) of the Trade Unions Act 1959 ('TUA'). Hence, the first plaintiff applied by way of the present originating summons, inter alia, for the following declarations, ie : (i) that a person who was a member of the plaintiff and who had been dismissed or retrenched from employment would still be considered and deemed to be a member of the plaintiff in the event such dismissal or retrenchment was challenged in any proceedings in court or representations had been made to the Director General of Industrial Relations ('DGIR') for his reinstatement to his former employment; and (ii) that the TUA read together with the IRA did not prevent a member of the plaintiff who had been dismissed or retrenched from employment from holding office as a member of the executive of the plaintiff, in the event such dismissal, termination, discharge or retrenchment was challenged in any proceedings in court or representations had been made to the DGIR for his reinstatement to his former employment. The sole issue for determination of the court related to the interpretation of s. 26(1A) of the TUA in a situation where an employee had been dismissed by an employer within a particular industry. More specifically, the issue was whether an employee who had been dismissed by an employer within a particular industry and whose dismissal had been challenged could continue to be a member of the Trade Union in that industry.

Held (allowing first plaintiff's application with costs):

    (1) Section 26(1A) of the TUA was enacted for the purpose of restricting membership of a particular union to only persons employed in that particular type of trade or occupation or industry and not to automatically strip members of their membership of the union merely due to the fact that they were terminated from their employment (notwithstanding that they were challenging their termination by seeking reinstatement under s. 20 of the IRA). To construe it as such would enlarge the powers of the DGTU to an unacceptable and arbitrary extent. Such a construction would also run counter to the express intention of the Parliament (paras 82 & 83).

    (2) The court can rely on the Hansard to assist it in the construction of a statute. The Minister's speech when tabling the Bill to amend s. 26(1A) in the Parliament in 1988 clearly disclosed the mischief aimed at or the legislative intention lying behind the ambiguous or obscure words, which was to confine the membership of the union only to persons engaged or employed in the trade, occupation or industry in respect of which the union was registered; Chor Phaik Har v. Farlim Properties Sdn Bhd (refd); National Union of Newspaper Workers v. Ketua Pengarah Kesatuan Sekerja (refd) (paras 83 & 89).

    (3) It would be premature to decide whether a member of a union has lost his membership due to a dismissal which is being challenged and where a representation has been made unders. 20 of the IRA and the matter referred to the Industrial Court for adjudication. This was because when an employee is dismissed and the matter was referred to the Industrial Court under s. 20 of the IRA, the burden is on the employer to prove that the dismissal was done with just cause and excuse. Thus, until and unless the Industrial Court has disposed of a representation made under s. 20 for reinstatement, another court may not deem that the workman has forfeited his union membership (para 132).

Case(s) referred to:

All Malayan Estates Staff Union v. Rajasegaran & Ors [2006] 4 CLJ 195 FC (refd)

Anthonyamah Anthony & Ors v. Socfin Co Bhd [1992] 3 CLJ 1410; [1992] 2 CLJ (Rep) 75 HC; [1992] 1 ILR 297 (dist)

Blackburn v. Attorney-General [1971] 2 All ER 1380 (refd)

Chor Phaik Har v. Farlim Properties Sdn Bhd [1994] 4 CLJ 285 FC (refd)

Duport Steels Ltd v. Sirs [1980] 1 WLR 142 (refd)

Hoh Kiang Ngan v. Mahkamah Perusahaan Malaysia & Anor [1996] 4 CLJ 687 FC (refd)

Kempas Edible Oil Sdn Bhd (Kilang Kempas Devon) v. All Malayan Estates Staff Union (Amesu) [2006] 4 ILR 2942 IC (dist)

Malaysian Bar v. Dato' Kanagalingam Veluppillai [2004] 4 CLJ 194 FC (refd)

National Union of Newspaper Workers v. Ketua Pengarah Kesatuan Sekerja [2000] 4 CLJ 233 FC (refd)

National Union Of Teachers In Independent Schools, West Malaysia v. Han Chiang High School, Penang [1989] 1 CLJ 1091; [1989] 2 CLJ (Rep) 160 HC (refd)

Palm Oil Research And Development Board Malaysia & Anor v. Premium Vegetable Oils Sdn Bhd [2004] 2 CLJ 265 FC (refd)

Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v. Hart [1993] 1 All ER 42 (refd)

Perusahaan Otomobil Kedua Sdn Bhd v. Ketua Pengarah Kesatuan Sekerja & Anor [2000] 5 CLJ 351 HC (dist)

PP v. Tan Tatt Eek & Other Appeals [2005] 1 CLJ 713 FC (refd)

R (on the application of Quintavalle) v. Secretary of State for Health [2003] 2 All ER 113 (refd)

Re Singapore Industrial Workers Union [1964] 1 LNS 178 HC (refd)

Salomon v. Commissioners of Customs & Excise [1967] 2 QB 116 (refd)

Seow Teck Ming & Anor v. Tan Ah Yeo & Anor [1991] 3 CLJ 2731; [1991] 4 CLJ (Rep) 576 CA (foll)

Wong Pot Heng v. Zainal Abidin Putih & Anor [1990] 2 CLJ 174; [1990] 1 CLJ (Rep) 312 SC (refd)

Legislation referred to:

Industrial Relations Act 1967, ss. 2, 4, 5, 7, 20, 26(2), 59

Interpretation Acts 1948 & 1967, s. 17A

Trade Unions Act 1959, ss. 2, 10(2), 12(3), 26(1A), (1B), 29(1), 66(2)

Counsel:

For the 1st plaintiff - Ambiga Sreenevasan; M/s Sreenevasan Young

For the 2nd plaintiff - Chandrasegaran (Pong Fook Chuah with him); M/s Prem & Chandra

For the 3rd - 11th plaintiffs - Anand Ponnudurai; M/s Bodipalar Ponnudurai De Silva

For the 1st defendant - AG's Chambers

For the 2nd - 11th defendants - M Eswary; M/s The Law Firm Of M Eswary

Reported by Amutha Suppayah

JUDGMENT

Alizatul Khair Osman J:

Introduction

[1] This is an application by way of originating summons (encl. 1) by the first plaintiff, the National Union of Bank Employees against the first respondent, the Director General of Trade Unions for, inter alia, the following reliefs:

    (i) a declaration that a person who is a member of the plaintiff and who has been dismissed, terminated, discharged or retrenched from employment would still be considered and be deemed a member of the plaintiff in the event such dismissal, termination, retrenchment is challenged in any proceedings in court or representations have been made to the Director General of Industrial Relations for his reinstatement to his former employment;

    (ii) a declaration that the Trade Unions Act 1959 read together with the Industrial Relations Act 1967 do not prevent a member of the plaintiff who has been dismissed, terminated, discharged or retrenched from employment from holding office as a member of the executive of the plaintiff, in the event such dismissal, termination, discharge or retrenchment is challenged in any proceedings in court or representations have been made to the Director General of Industrial Relations for his reinstatement to his former employment; and

    (iii) a declaration that Mr Sandagran Solomon Joseph Pitchay who was elected as general secretary of the plaintiff on 7 August 2005 and re-elected as general secretary on 26 July 2008 was rightly and lawfully elected as general secretary of the plaintiff.

[2] The second to 11th defendants were added as defendants pursuant to an application to intervene and vide order of court dated 16 December 2008.

[3] The second to 11th defendants were members of the first plaintiff who were at the material time employed in the industry in respect of which the first plaintiff was registered.

[4] The second to 11th plaintiffs were added as plaintiffs to this application pursuant to an application to intervene and vide order of this court dated 6 January 2009 and 9 April 2009 respectively.

Background

[5] The background facts leading to this application as set out in the first plaintiff's written submissions and in the affidavit in support of the originating summons (encl. 2) were as follows:

    Sometime towards the end of 2004, several members of the first plaintiff filed an application to the High Court for an order to direct the DGTU to conduct elections to resolve the ongoing internal dispute and leadership crisis facing the first plaintiff. The High Court dismissed the application but on appeal, the Court of Appeal, allowed the appeal and made an order directing the DGTU to conduct elections within four months and thereupon to announce the outcome of the elections within 24 hours upon completion of the elections. The outcome of the elections was that Mr Solomon won by a majority of votes for the post of Branch Committee member at the Penang branch level and the post of general secretary at the national level respectively.

[6] Since 8 August 2005 therefore, Mr Solomon has been holding the position of general secretary of the first plaintiff and conducting the administration of the first plaintiff.

[7] Mr Solomon was allowed to stand for elections and to be elected as the general secretary in 2005 by the then DGTU even though he was dismissed from employment prior to that in 2004. In fact, at the material time in 2005 the then DGTU also took the position that one Encik Muhammad Fauzi bin Haji Shamsuddin who was running for the post of president was allowed to stand for elections notwithstanding the fact that he was also dismissed and/or terminated from employment at the material time and was challenging the dismissal.

[8] The details relating to Mr Solomon's dismissal and the subsequent reference to the Industrial Court were as follows:

    (i) Mr Solomon, the general secretary of the first plaintiff was dismissed from employment together with nine other members of the first plaintiff by CIMB Bank Berhad on 27 April 2004 for allegedly unlawful picketing.

    (ii) Mr Solomon and the other eight members concerned challenged the dismissal and a representation was made to the Industrial Court pursuant to s. 20 of the Industrial Relations Act, 1967 ('IRA'). The representation was heard by the Industrial Court, and at the time the OS was filed, was pending decision.

[9] According to the DGTU, Mr Solomon was allowed to continue being a member of the first plaintiff and to stand for elections based on the opinion of the then legal adviser (of the Ministry of Human Resources) who was of the view that Mr Solomon remained a workman as defined under the IRA until his representation to the Industrial Court on his dismissal was finally decided. (see paras. 12.2.1 - 12.2.7., encl. 12).

[10] However in 2008, following an exchange of correspondence between the DGTU's office and the first plaintiff regarding the status of Mr Solomon (as general secretary of the first plaintiff) arising from a query raised initially by the then President of the Industrial Court when Mr Solomon appeared for the first plaintiff before her, the DGTU on 1 July 2008 wrote to Mr Solomon. In the letter dated 1 July 2008, the DGTU stated that pursuant to queries from members pertaining to the status of the general secretary of the first plaintiffs, the DGTU referred the issue to the Attorney General's Chambers, who gave the following interpretation of s. 26(1A) of the Trade Unions Act 1959 ("TUA"):

    Subseksyen 26(1A) Akta Kesatuan Sekerja (Akta 262) memperuntukkan bahawa seseorang yang "not employed or engaged" in any establishment, trade, occupation or industry in respect of which the trade union is registered" tidak boleh menjadi anggota sesebuah kesatuan sekerja. Perkataan employed and engaged... merujuk kepada sesorang yang masih bekerja dengan majikannya dan tidak meliputi seseorang yang telah diberhentikan kerja walaupun pekerja tersebut telah pun memfailkan representasi mengenai pembuangan kerjanya.

    (see exh. OP-2 of the first respondent's affidavit in reply dated 10 October 2008).

[11] The first plaintiff viewed the interpretation as "a grave departure" from previous practice and a drastic stance taken by the first defendant as at all material times the first plaintiff had treated and deemed members who were dismissed as members so long as their dismissals were being challenged. The implication from the aforesaid interpretation, in the first plaintiff's view, was that any member of the first plaintiff who was dismissed would automatically lose his membership of the union and all benefits and rights that attach to his membership. Vide letter dated 9 July 2008 to the DGTU, the first plaintiff, after seeking legal advice disputed the interpretation of the Attorney General's Chambers. The DGTU in its reply dated 21 July 2008 reiterated its stand on the matter as per its earlier letter of 1 July 2008.

(see exhs. A-11 and A-22, encl. 2 respectively).

[12] Arising out of the above sequence of events, the first plaintiff filed these present proceedings.

[13] For completeness it should be mentioned that sometime in April 2008, the first plaintiff's elections at branch levels were conducted. The principal office bearers of the first plaintiff were unanimously nominated to hold on to their respective positions for the ensuing term of 2008-2011. The result was that all the principal officer bearers of the first plaintiff were retained in their positions unopposed. Thus, Mr Solomon retained his position as general secretary of the plaintiff effectively for the term April 2008 to April 2011, when elections were next due.

Issue

[14] Arising out of the above facts the sole issue for determination before the court relates to the interpretation of s. 26(1A) of the Trade Unions Act 1959 (TUA) in a situation where an employee has been dismissed by an employer within a particular industry. More specifically, the issue was whether an employee who has been dismissed by an employer within a particular industry and whose dismissal has been challenged can continue to be a member of the trade union in that industry.

[15] Section 26(1A) of the TUA reads as follows:

    No person shall join, or be a member of, or be accepted or retained as a member of any trade union if he is not employed or engaged in any establishment, trade, occupation in respect of which the trade union is registered. (emphasis added)

First Plaintiff's Submission

[16] It was the first plaintiff's submission that s. 26(1A) of the TUA ("s. 26(1A)") did not preclude membership of a trade union in the circumstances where an employee has been dismissed and whose dismissal has been challenged.

[17] At the start of her submission learned counsel for the appellant urged the court to disregard:

    (a) paragraphs 13 to 17 of the second to 11th defendant's affidavit; and

    (b) paragraphs 3 to 6 of the first defendant's affidavits,

as they do not in any way assist the court in the construction of either the TUA or the IRA nor do they have any bearing on the construction of either legislation. Further these allegations and complaints were strongly disputed and were nothing more than allegations and complaints against the general secretary to the first plaintiff.

[18] Learned counsel also reminded the court of the terms of the court's order on 16 December 2008 which allowed the intervention of the second to 11th defendants which were as follows:

    ... Adalah Diperintahkan bahawa Pencelah-pencelah (kecuali Pencelah No. 9) diberi kebenaran untuk mencelah dalam prosiding ini dan setelah ditambahkan sebagai Defendan 2 hingga 11 dalam tindakan ini dengan menghadkan diri mereka kepada isu-isu, fakta-fakta dan undang-undang yang telah dibangkitkan di dalam Saman Pemula (kandungan 1) dan Afidavit Sokongan yang diikrarkan oleh Sandagran Solomon a/l Josepah Pitchay pada 8 Ogos 2008 (Kandungan 2) sahaja DAN Akhirnya Diperintahkan bahawa tiada perintah terhadap kos.

[19] Consequently the parties ought to confine themselves only to facts which have a bearing on the construction of s. 26(1A) and other relevant provisions in the TUA and the IRA.

[20] The first plaintiff's contention that s. 26(1A) do not preclude members who have been dismissed and whose dismissal is being challenged from being members of a trade union is premised on the following proposition of law:

[21] Firstly, on the interpretation of s. 26(1A):

    (a) the interpretation of "trade union" in the TUA read together with the definition of "workman" under s. 2 of the TUA and under s. 2 of the IRA.

[22] The definition of "trade union" under s. 2 of the TUA is as follows:

    "trade union" or "union" means any association or combination of workmen or employers, being workmen whose place of work is in West Malaysia, Sabah or Sarawak, as the case may be, or employers employing workmen in West Malaysia, Sabah or Sarawak as the case may be:

        (a) within any particular establishment, trade, occupation or industry or within any similar trades, occupations or industries;...

    "Workman" is in turn defined as "...any person, including an apprentice, employed by an employer under a contract of employment to work for hire or reward and for the purposes of any proceedings in relation to a trade dispute includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with or as a consequence of that dispute or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute.

    Under the same section of the TUA. (emphasis added)

[23] The same definition of "workman" is found in s. 2 of the IRA.

(b) Rule 4.7 of the constitution of the NUBE which reads as follows:

    Any member who has been in the Union for a period of more than six months and is retrenched from his employment for taking an active part in any movement authorized by the National Executive Council or Branch Committee, or for being a Branch Officer of the Union and for doing his duty in that capacity, or for any other reason which in the opinion of the National Executive Council, be entitled to and be given such assistance, legal, financial and/or otherwise, as shall from time to time be determined by the National Executive Council, having regard to the circumstances of each individual case. In determining any such case the National Executive Council shall be guided by the principle that any member or members so discharged from his or their employment is or are entitled to the greatest assistance which it is in the power of the Union to grant, whether legal, financial, moral or otherwise with a view to his or their reinstatement or other reasonable compensation.

[24] As this rule expressly provides for the first plaintiff to render all such assistance as is necessary to any "member" who is discharged from employment with a view to his reinstatement or compensation, it therefore implicitly recognises that a person who is discharged or terminated from employment is still a member of the trade union concerned and is entitled to all such assistance as stated therein.

[25] In this regard learned counsel referred to s. 66(2) of the TUA which provides that:

    Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to authorize a trade union to act contrary to, or in excess of the powers conferred upon it by, it a rules.

[26] The rules of the trade union ie, the constitution of NUBE in this case, having "in a sense" been approved by the DGTU (as seen from ss. 10(2) and 12(3)) it would therefore lend force to the plaintiff's argument that s. 26(1A) must be construed in the manner proposed for the rules to be consistent with the TUA.

(c) The primary purpose for the enactment of s. 26(1A) of the TUA was to limit membership of a particular union to only persons in a particular trade or industry.

[27] Section 26(1A) was not enacted to preclude a member who has been dismissed (and who is challenging his dismissal) from continuing to be a member of a trade union of a particular type of trade or occupation or industry to which the said member belonged to.

[28] Learned counsel argued that s. 26(1A) was enacted to ensure that only persons employed in a particular trade or industry may be members of a union in that particular trade or industry, for example, a hotel worker can only be a member of the Hotel Workers' Union and cannot be a member of the Newspaper Union Workers' Union.

[29] This was evident from the speech of the Minister when tabling the Bill proposing the amendment to s. 26(1A) as recorded in the Hansard dated 12 October 1988 which is reproduced below:

    Pindaan yang dicadangkan di bawah Fasal 6 adalah bertujuan menjadikan s. 26(1A) lebih jelas dan tepat untuk memastikan bahawa seseorang pekerja tidak boleh menganggotai atau terus menjadi ahli suatu kesatuan jika ia tidak digaji dalam tred, pekerjaan atau industri yang ada kaitan dengan kesatuan itu. Peruntukan yang ada sekarang kurang jelas sama ada seseorang yang telah masuk menjadi ahli kesatuan dan kemudiannya berhenti dari digaji dalam tred, pekerjaan atau industri berkenaan boleh mengekalkan keahliannya. Walaubagaimanapun, seseorang yang dipilih oleh ahli-ahli kesatuan dan digaji untuk bekerja sepenuh masa sebagai Setiausaha, Penolong Setiausaha, Bendahari atau Penolong Bendahari Kesatuan menurut s. 29(1)(a) adalah dianggap sebagai digaji dalam tred, pekerjaan atau industri yang berkenaan.

[30] That this was the primary purpose for the enactment of s. 26(1A) of the TUA was reinforced by the Federal Court decision in the case of National Union of Newspaper Workers v. Ketua Pengarah Kesatuan Sekerja [2000] 4 CLJ 233; [2000] 3 MLJ 689. In that case employees of two companies involved in publications namely, FPSB and STPD were members of a union called NUPW. The companies subsequently decided not to recognise NUPW as both the companies were no longer involved or connected with the newspaper publishing industry. The matter was referred to the DGTU. After due investigation, the DGTU found that both companies were no longer involved in the newspaper publishing industry.

[31] As the NUPW's constitution provided for membership of the union to be strictly for employees of the newspaper publishing and subsidiary industries only the DGTU accordingly decided that employees of both FPSB and STPD cannot be accepted or continue to be members of NUPW.

[32] The Federal Court agreed with the Court of Appeal that s. 26(1A) of the TUA can be applied by the DGTU to render the entire membership of the union in FPSB and STPD not eligible and the union incompetent to represent the entire membership of the companies.

[33] Secondly, the court should adopt a purposive approach in interpreting the TUA as the TUA is a "piece of social legislation that was enacted to regulate and prescribe rules for the formation of unions and regulate the trade union movement" with the underlying objective of promoting "social harmony between employers and workers who form the trade union movement."

[34] The purposive approach would require the court to interpret the provisions of the TUA such that they are in accord with the purpose of the TUA ie, "to provide social harmony between the employers and the employees".

[35] Counsel for the first plaintiff submitted that the courts have consistently applied the purposive approach in interpreting social legislation like the TUA and the IRA.

[36] The interpretation of s. 26(1A) by the DGTU on the other hand would not promote social harmony but would instead promote "union busting".

[37] This means that employers can successfully rid themselves of union members who are vocal and regarded as 'problematic' by terminating or discharging them and thereby removing them from the union. Other employees too would be afraid to not only be active but also to join a union out of fear of reprisal. This according to counsel could not be the intention of the TUA.

[38] The first plaintiff relied on s. 17A of the Interpretation Acts, 1948 and 1967 and the following cases in support of their proposition:

    (a) All Malayan Estates Staff Union v. Rajasegaran & Ors [2006] 4 CLJ 195; [2006] 6 MLJ 97;

    (b) Palm Oil Research And Development Board Malaysia & Anor v. Premium Vegetable Oils Sdn Bhd [2004] 2 CLJ 265; [2005] 3 MLJ 97;

    (c) R (on the application of Quintavalle) v. Secretary of State for Health [2003] 2 All ER 113;

    (d) Chor Phaik Har v. Farlim Properties Sdn Bhd [1994] 4 CLJ 285; [1994] 3 MLJ 345; and

    (e) Hoh Kiang Ngan v. Mahkamah Perusahaan Malaysia & Anor [1996] 4 CLJ 687; [1995] 3 MLJ 369.

[39] Thirdly, it was the first plaintiff's submission that in the case of a dismissal referred to the Industrial Court under s. 20 of the IRA, the burden of proving that an employee is dismissed with just cause is on the employers. If an employer fails to prove that the dismissal was justified, the employee was deemed to have been dismissed without just cause or excuse. Thus until and unless the Industrial Court has disposed of a representation under s. 20 of the IRA for reinstatement, another court may not deem that the workman has forfeited his union membership. Citing the case of National Union Of Teachers In Independent Schools, West Malaysia v. Han Chiang High School, Penang [1989] 1 CLJ 1091; [1989] 2 CLJ (Rep) 160; [1989] 2 MLJ 114, as authority for this proposition, learned counsel argued that it would be premature in the present case for this court to decide whether a member of a union (Mr Solomon) has lost his membership due to a dismissal as his dismissal has been challenged by way of a representation under s. 20 (of the IRA) and the matter referred to the Industrial Court for adjudication. In the present case Mr Solomon is seeking reinstatement to his former employment with CIMB.

[40] Finally, learned counsel for the plaintiff, Dato' Ambiga Sreenevasan ("Dato' Ambiga") informed the court that the MTUC at its second general council meeting on 3 August 2008 "unanimously opposed the stand and interpretation of s. 26(1A) of the Trade Unions Act 1959 as interpreted by the Attorney General's Chambers and being adopted by the DGTU."

The Defendants' Submission

The First Defendant's Submission

[41] Learned Senior Federal Counsel on behalf of the first defendant explained that apart from the query by the then President of the Industrial Court, numerous complaints were received by the DGTU regarding the status of officers of trade unions, who, despite being no longer in the employment of any establishment, trade, occupation or industry in respect of which the relevant unions were registered continued to remain in the post of secretary-general of related trade unions.

[42] More specifically the Attorney-General Chamber's opinion was sought following events leading to the re-election of Mr Solomon as the secretary general. According to learned Senior Federal Counsel, in 2005 prior to the re-election of Mr Solomon, the Attorney-General's Chambers' legal opinion was not obtained specifically on the issue as to whether a member who was dismissed was competent to stand for elections and hold office in the plaintiff's unions.

(see para. 4.3, p. 3 of the first respondent's affidavits in reply dated 10 October 2008).

[43] However the opinion contained in the Attorney-General's Chambers' letter to the legal adviser dated 8 May 2008 (OP-2) was specifically in reply to the issue posed to it viz :

    whether a person who has been dismissed and has filed a representation under s. 20 of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 [Act 177] is competent to stand for election to be officers of the union.

[44] The first defendant's argument as regards the issue posed before the court was that, contrary to the submission of the first plaintiff, the clear words of s. 26(1A) and other related provisions of the TUA do not call for a purposive interpretation to be adopted in interpreting these provisions of the Act.

[45] Learned Senior Federal Counsel ("SFC") quoted Mohamad Azmi, SCJ's judgment in Wong Pot Heng v. Zainal Abidin Putih & Anor [1990] 2 CLJ 174; [1990] 1 CLJ (Rep) 312; [1990] 1 ILR 565; [1990] 3 MTC 141; [1991] 1 MLJ 410 in which His Lordship held:

    The purposive construction of statutes was first adopted by the House of Lords in Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines. It is a well established principle that the purposive approach to the interpretation of legislation only applies where any doubt arises from the terms or words employed by the legislative. But where the words are precise and unambiguous, then the literal and strict construction rule should apply.

[46] Reference was also made to the Federal Court case of Malaysian Bar v. Dato' Kanagalingam Veluppillai [2004] 4 CLJ 194 where the Federal Court cited with approval of Lord Diplock's observation in Duport Steels Ltd v. Sirs [1980] 1 WLR 142 at p. 157 that:

    where the meaning of the statutory words is plain and unambiguous it is not for the judges to invent fancied ambiguities as an excuse for failing to give effect the plain meaning because they themselves consider that the consequences of doing so would be inexpedient or even unjust or immoral...

[47] With that in mind, learned SFC proceeded to argue as follows:

    Firstly, in construing s. 26(1A) it is not necessary to refer to the definition of "workman" under s. 2 of the TUA as the meaning of "workman" in that section in particular the phrase "includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched..." is limited only to proceedings in relation to a "trade dispute". "Trade Dispute" in turn is defined to mean "any dispute between an employer and his workmen which is connected with the employment or non-employment of the terms of employment or the conditions of work of any such workmen." (see s. 2 of the TUA).

[48] In light of the above, the definition of "workman" in s. 2 of the TUA is clearly not applicable for the purposes of construing s. 26(1A).

[49] Instead, the words "employed or engaged" in s. 26(1A) should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. As the words are not defined in the TUA, regard must be to the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary in order to ascertain their ordinary meaning of these words. According to the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 'employed' means "be engaged in; be at work" and 'engaged' means "take service with or with an employer". Based on the above definition learned SFC argued that:

    ... in the case of Mr J Solomon, since he was dismissed he is not at work and not with any employer. It logically follows that Mr J Solomon is "a person not employed or engaged in any establishment, trade, occupation or industry" class of persons envisaged under s. 26(1A).

[50] Pursuant to the above argument, she came to the following conclusion:

    Once a person is not employed or engaged in any establishment, trade, occupation or industry in respect of which the trade union is registered, the person loses his status as union member. Thus this person is not eligible to act as officers (sic ) of the union.

[51] Learned SFC added that as the relevant part of the definition of "workman" in the TUA is limited to proceedings in relation to a trade dispute, the court cannot extend the definition to include the right or entitlement to be retained as a member of a trade union or the right or entitlement to stand for election as an officer of a trade union.

[52] The following cases were relied on by the SFC in support of her submission:

    (a) Kempas Edible Oil Sdn Bhd (Kilang Kempas Devon) v. All Malayan Estates Staff Union (Amesu) [2006] 4 ILR 2942;

    (b) National Union of Newspaper Workers (supra );

    (c) Anthonyamah Anthony & Ors v. Socfin & Co Bhd [1992] 3 CLJ 1410; [1992] 2 CLJ (Rep) 75; [1992] 1 ILR 297; and

    (d) Perusahaan Otomobil Kedua Sdn Bhd v. Ketua Pengarah Kesatuan Pekerja [2000] 5 CLJ 351 (Perusahaan Otomobil).

The Second To 11th Defendants' Submission

[53] The stand of the second to the 11th defendants as regards the issue at hand is essentially the same as that of the first defendant.

[54] Briefly the second and 11th defendants' stand was that the direction of the DGTU which was made after seeking the advice of the Attorney-General's Chambers was the true interpretation of s. 26(1A) and was in accordance with the intention of Parliament.

[55] It was their submission that in amending s. 26(1A) Parliament had in mind that only persons employed or engaged in any establishment, trade, occupation or industry in respect of which the trade is registered shall join or be accepted or retained as a member of a trade union, the emphasis being on the words employed or engaged.

[56] Learned counsel also agreed with SFC's submission that as the wording of s. 26(1A) is clear and unambiguous "the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of the consequences." For this proposition learned counsel relied on the case of PP v. Tan Tatt Eek & Other Appeals [2005] 1 CLJ 713.

[57] Learned counsel then referred to the definition of "trade union" in the TUA and the IRA; the definition of "workman" and "trade dispute" in both Acts and arrived at the following proposition:

    (a) Based on the definition of "trade dispute" (which is the same under the TUA and the IRA), the parties to a trade dispute are the employer and his workman. A workman is defined in the TUA as a "person including an apprentice, employed by an employer under a contract of employment to work for hire or reward". Therefore the workman must ordinarily be in actual employment at the time of the dispute. But when he is already dismissed or discharged or retrenched, and this has given rise to a dispute, he is still a workman for the purpose of that dispute.

    (b) There is no mention of trade unions of employers or workmen in the definition of trade disputes. Hence there can be a trade dispute without unions. But when a trade union represents employers and workmen who are actually in dispute with each other, they became parties to the dispute. Consequently, when a person who was a member of a trade union is dismissed and the dismissal is challenged under s. 20 of the IRA, he is a workman for the purposes of that dispute but not for the purpose of s. 26(1A) as alleged by the plaintiffs.

    This is clear from the second part of the definition in the TUA which reads, "and for the purposes of any proceedings in relation to a trade dispute includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with or as a consequence of that dispute or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute". (emphasis added)

    It is defined as such in order to give cognisance to one of the objects of a trade union, namely para. (c)(ii) of the definition of trade union, wherein the trade union will represent the workman who was a member of the said union at the time of dismissal and whose dismissal has led to a trade dispute.

    (c) As regards to the second part of the definition of "workman" in the IRA, (which is the same as that of the definition of 'workman' under the TUA) it was defined as such in order for, amongst others, to enable the trade unions to represent workmen who were its' members at the time of their dismissal and whose dismissal has led to a trade dispute; to represent the workman in a reference under s. 26 which includes collective agreements as the definition of trade dispute also includes "the terms of employment or the conditions of work of any such workmen". The reason being any dismissed, retrenched or discharged, employees, who were members of the trade union at the material time of the duration of the collective agreement would be entitled to the monetary benefits to be awarded under the collective agreement.

    (d) It was therefore apparent from the wording of s. 26(1A) that in order to be a member of a trade union, or be accepted or retained as a member one should be employed or engaged in any establishment, trade or industry. The second part of the definition of 'workman' should not be read into s. 26(1A). In fact the first part of the definition of 'workman' should be read into the s. 26(1A) since member is not defined in the TUA and the section uses the word 'person'. Hence, a member who has been dismissed is no longer retained in employment, as upon dismissal his contract of employment with the employer is severed. The only right a member has upon being dismissed by his employer, is the right to be represented by the trade union in the dispute that was brought about by his dismissal. For that purpose he is a "workman" as defined under the TUA and the IRA.

    (e) Rule 4.7 is a recognition of this right as it provides for representation by a trade union of a dismissed member. However it is not anywhere stated in the rules and constitution of the first plaintiff that a member who has been dismissed and who challenged his dismissal continues to be a member and to hold a position in the trade union, as alleged by the first plaintiff. In fact r. 3 of the rules and constitution of the first plaintiff expressly states as follows:

        Rule 3 - membership

        1. Membership of the Union shall be open to all employees, whether permanent or temporary, who are employed in any commercial bank or its subsidiary finance company in Peninsula Malaysia who are above the age of sixteen, excluding those who are employed in a managerial, executive, confidential or security capacity...

[58] Thus in Re Singapore Industrial Workers Union [1964] 1 LNS 178; [1964] 30 MLJ in respect of a similar provision in the union's rule the court held that:

    ... To become a member of the union, a person must in the first place be over the age of 18, and secondly he must be employed in any private undertaking or industry in Singapore.

[59] In light of the above, learned counsel reiterated that the court cannot extend the prohibitory provisions of s. 26(1A) and the present provisions of the rules and constitution of the first plaintiff which were consonant with the said section by granting the declarations sought by the first plaintiff as it will, according to counsel "amount to a contravention of s. 26(1A) of the Act".

[60] On the issue of whether the said member can continue to hold office in any trade union, counsel drew the court's attention to the amendment to s. 26(1B) of the TUA, which was introduced together with the amendment to s. 26(1A) in 1988. The said s. 26(1B) reads as follows:

    For the purposes of subsection (IA), any person who is employed by a trade union as a member of its executive under paragraph (a) of the proviso to s. 29(1) shall be deemed to be employed or engaged in the establishment, trade, occupation or industry concerned.

[61] It was counsel's submission that this section can never be interpreted to mean that a dismissed member can be employed by the union as he can be deemed employed by virtue of this section, for the following reasons:

    (i) section 26(1B) must be read together with s. 29(1) of the TUA which stipulates thus:

        A registered trade union may, subject to subsection (2) and of the rules of the such union, employ and pay a secretary, treasurer and such other person as may be necessary for the purposes of such union or of any federation of trade unions to which the union belongs:

        Provided that no employee of such union other than:

            (a) The holder of a full-time office as secretary, assistant secretary, treasurer or assistant treasurer who is elected in accordance with the rules of such union;...

            (b)...

        shall be a member of the executive of such union.

        (emphasis added)

    (ii) in order to be elected in accordance with the rules of such union as stated in s. 29(1)(a), and nominated, the member must be a Malaysian citizen, has attained the age of 21 years and has been working in the bank/finance company for the last one year;

    (iii) a dismissed employee who does not have an employer cannot hold a position in a trade union. In other words, the employment status is a pre-condition to enable one to be a member and to hold office in a trade union; and

    (iv) the deeming provision in s. 26(1B) applies to members of the trade union, namely persons employed with an employer, who are subsequently elected in accordance with the rules of the union as executive.

[62] In addition counsel referred to r. 14 of the first plaintiff's constitution and rules which provided as follows:

    1. (a) An Officer of the Union shall mean any member of the National Executive Council, or of any Branch Committee of the Union, but shall not include an auditor. Not less than two-thirds of the total number of the officers of the Union, other than the general secretary, the treasurer and the trustees, shall be persons actually engaged or employed in the occupation, trade or industry with which the Union is connected.

    (b) No person shall be elected or act as an officer of the Union if:

        (i) He is not a member of the Union; or

        (ii)...

        (iii)...

        (iv) He has not been engaged or employed for a period of a least one year in the occupation, trade or industry with which the union is connect; or...

[63] It is an express provision of the rules that a general secretary, the treasurer and trustees, shall be persons actually engaged or employed in the occupation.

[64] The only conclusion to be made on all the foregoing was that the intention, object and purpose is clear, namely in order to be a member and/or to hold the position of an officer of a trade union, employment status is a pre-condition.

[65] Finally, learned counsel submitted the following reasons in support of their contention as to why a dismissed or terminated member whose dismissal or termination is challenged can never be considered to be a member of a trade union:

    (a) A claim for reinstatement should be considered as a dispute between the employer and employee and should not be connected with the status of the employee concerned as a member of the trade union.

    (b) The employees' right to join and remain as members of any trade unions depend on the existence of contracts of employment and when the contract ends, the right to remain in the trade union ends as well. As such, if such an employee is holding any position in the union he should relinquish it.

    (c) If a dismissed employee is allowed to hold any elected position in any trade union especially in respect of the main position of general secretary as in the first plaintiff, it will lead to abuse of power wherein the trade union will be used for his own benefit as is apparent from all the complaints made by the members of the first plaintiff to DGTU.

    (d) For a dispute to be referred to the Industrial Court it will take a minimum of one to two years. For the said dispute to be concluded and for an award to be handed down by the Industrial Court it will take another two to five years. An example of this can be seen in the dispute between the general secretary of the first plaintiff with his former employer wherein the Industrial Court was yet to hand down the decision despite the fact that he was dismissed in 2004.

    (e) Furthermore, reinstatement is not the only remedy to be awarded by the Industrial Court and the unsuccessful party might take it up on judicial review to the High Court, appeal to the Court of Appeal and Federal Court accordingly which might take another five years or more.

    (f) Section 26(1A) also cater for in-house unions. In this situation, it is quite unlikely for any organisation to agree to have a collective bargaining with the in-house union if the general secretary of the union is an employee who was dismissed by the said organisation.

Decision

[66] Having considered the submissions of both the plaintiff and the defendants very carefully, I was inclined to agree with the submission of the first plaintiff as regard the issue posed before the court and I accordingly granted the reliefs sought by the first plaintiff in prayer (1) and (2) of the OS, prayer (3) having been withdrawn by Dato' Ambiga at the conclusion of the first plaintiff's submission, with costs to be taxed and paid to the first plaintiff.

[67] I append below the reasons for my decision:

    At the outset, I would like to state that in the course of submission before me, the Industrial Court on 27 October 2009 handed down its award. The Industrial Court found that the applicants' (ie, Mr Solomon and the other eight members concerned) dismissal was with just cause and excuse and dismissed the applicant's claim. The applicants proceeded to file, on 30 November 2009, an application for judicial review to quash the said award. Learned counsel for the first plaintiff, Dato' Ambiga informed the court that the said award would not change the first plaintiff's submission on the issue before the court.

[68] As regards Dato' Ambiga's plea that the court ignore the complaints and allegations against Mr Solomon and the first plaintiff (which were disputed), bearing in mind the terms of the court order dated 16 December 2008 and the fact that they did not assist the court in any way in determining the issue at hand, I was of the view that these complaints and allegations constitute the background facts leading to the issue before the court and in that sense they would assist the court in understanding the context in which this issue arose. Other than that I agreed that the issue before the court was essentially one of law, more particularly the construction of s. 26(1A) of the TUA and other related provisions of the TUA and the IRA.

[69] As submitted by both learned counsels for the first plaintiff and the defendants the sole issue for the court's consideration was whether under s. 26(1A) an employee of a particular industry who has been dismissed and whose dismissal was challenged can continue or be retained as a member of the trade union in that industry.

[70] This issue as pointed out earlier, arose out of the Attorney-General's Chambers' interpretation of that section as contained in the then DGTU's letter dated 1 July 2008 to Mr Solomon (supra ). The gist of the Attorney-General's Chambers' interpretation was that under s. 26(1A) of the TUA a person who was not employed or engaged in any establishment, trade, occupation or industry in respect of which the trade union was registered was precluded from being a member of the union. The words "employed or engaged" according to the Attorney-General's Chambers refers to a person who was still in the employment of his employer and did not include a person who had been dismissed from employment notwithstanding that the dismissal was challenged under the IRA.

[71] This would mean that Mr Solomon along with nine other members of the first plaintiff who were dismissed by their employer CIMB Bank Berhad for (allegedly) unlawful picketing but who had challenged the dismissal would automatically lose their membership and be precluded from holding any position in the union. Contending that such an interpretation would have grave consequences not only on the first plaintiff but also other trade unions in the country, the first plaintiff strongly disputed the interpretation of s. 26(1A) given by the Attorney-General's Chambers. In their view, "union busting" or the practice of employers dismissing employees who were members of trade union merely to stop them from being members of a union could take place arising from such an interpretation. Such a practice could cripple the trade union movement in the country.

[72] Mindful of the serious consequences that would ensue from such an interpretation, the first plaintiff, (joined later by the second to 10th plaintiffs) having all along treated and deemed members who were dismissed as members so long as their dismissals were being challenged, filed this application seeking the following declaration.

    (1) a declaration that a person who is a member of the plaintiff and who has been dismissed, terminated, discharged or retrenched from employment would still be considered and be deemed a member of the plaintiff in the event such dismissal, termination, retrenchment is challenged in any proceedings in court or representations have been made to the Director General of Industrial Relations for his reinstatement to his former employment; and

    (2) a declaration that the Trade Unions Act 1959 read together with the Industrial Relations Act 1967 do not prevent a member of the plaintiff who has been dismissed, terminated, discharged or retrenched from employment from holding office as a member of the executive of the plaintiff, in the event such dismissal, termination, discharge or retrenchment is challenged in any proceedings in court or representations have been made to the Director General of Industrial Relations for his reinstatement to his former employment.

[73] Section 26(1A) as stated earlier reads as follows:

    No person shall join, or be a member of, or be accepted or retained as a member by, any trade union if he is not employed or engaged in any establishment, trade, occupation or industry in respect of which the trade union is registered.

    (emphasis added)

[74] At first blush it would appear that s. 26(1A) prohibits any person from being a member of or be accepted or retained as a member by, any trade union unless he is employed or engaged in a trade or industry of which the trade union is registered. In other words as suggested by the defendants, and as interpreted by the Attorney-General's Chambers the purpose of s. 26(1A) was clear and unambiguous - it was to exclude any person from being a member or to continue to be a member of a trade union unless he was employed or engaged in the establishment, trade, occupation or industry of which the trade union was registered, the key words being employed or engaged. Thus a person, such as Mr Solomon, who was dismissed, was no longer employed or engaged in the trade or occupation of which the first plaintiff was registered and he therefore could no longer continue to be a member of the union (ie, the first plaintiff) let alone continue to be an officer of the union.

[75] However upon examining s. 26(1A) I would agree with the plaintiffs that the primary purpose for the enactment of s. 26(1A) was to restrict the eligibility of membership of a trade union to persons engaged in the particular trade, occupation or industry in respect of which the trade union was registered.

[76] This can be seen from the Minister's speech when tabling the bill to amend s. 26(1A) in Parliament in 1988. In his speech, the then Minister of Labour, Mr Lee Kim Sai (as he was then known as) stated in clear and specific terms that the purpose of the amendment to s. 26(1A) was to "menjadikan s. 26(1A) lebih jelas dan tepat untuk memastikan bahawa seseorang pekerja tidak boleh menjadi ahli suatu kesatuan jika ia tidak digaji dalam tred, pekerjaan atau industri yang ada kaitan dengan kesatuan itu."

(see the full excerpt of the Minister's speech as extracted from the Hansard dated 12 October 1988 at p. 13 (supra )).

[77] This amendment was thought to be necessary because s. 26(1A) in its original form did not state with sufficient clarity whether a member who subsequently ceased to be employed in the trade or industry of the union concerned can continue to retain his membership in the said union.

[78] Prior to the aforesaid amendment, s. 26(1A) read as follows:

    No person shall join, or be a member of, or be accepted or retained as a member by, in any trade, occupation or industry which is not similar to the trade, occupation or industry in respect of which the trade union is registered.

    (emphasis added)

[79] Subsection (1A), it must be said, was inserted in s. 26 in 1980 pursuant to the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act 1980 (Act A483).

[80] In 1989 s. 26(1A) underwent a further amendment with the passing of the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act 1989 (Act A732) which added the word "establishment" after the words "in any" in the said subsection.

[81] Thus s. 26(1A) in its present form reads:

    No person shall join, or be a member of, or be accepted or retained as a member by, any trade union if he is not employed or engaged in any establishment, trade, occupation or industry in respect of which the trade union is registered. (emphasis added)

[82] Following from the above it was therefore clear that s. 26(1A) was enacted for the purpose of restricting membership of a particular union to only persons employed in that particular type of trade or occupation or industry and not for the purpose contended by the defendants (and as opined by the Attorney-General's Chambers) ie, to automatically strip members of their membership of the union merely due to the fact that they were terminated from their employment notwithstanding that they were challenging their termination by seeking reinstatement under s. 20 of the IRA. To construe it as such would, as submitted by learned counsel for the first plaintiff, "enlarge the powers of the DGTU to an unacceptable and arbitrary extent."

[83] Such a construction would also run counter to the express intention of Parliament as manifested by the Minister's speech. It has been established by the Federal Court in Chor Phaik Har v. Farlim Properties Sdn Bhd [1994] 4 CLJ 285 that the court can rely on the Hansard to assist it in the construction of a statute. There the Federal Court cited with approval the landmark decision of the House of Lords in Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v. Hart [1993] 1 All ER 42; [1992] 3 WLR 1032 (Pepper v. Hart ) which decided that it was permissible in certain circumstances to refer to the reports in Hansard proceedings in either Houses of Parliament, when construing a statute.

[84] Following the judgment in Pepper v. Hart the Federal Court held that:

    In construing a statute, a reference to Parliamentary reports of proceeding or Hansard, as an aid to statutory interpretation, should be permitted where the enactment is ambiguous or obscure, or which if literally construed might lead to an absurdity provided that the statement reported in Hansard was made by a Minister or other promoter of a Bill.

    (emphasis added)

[85] The Federal Court however cautioned that:

    Hansard was only an aid to interpretation and could not be determinative of the issue for that would amount to substituting the words of the Minister or promoter of the Bill for the words of the statute.

[86] In the abovesaid case the Federal Court found the ministerial statement reported in the Hansard to be of no assistance to the court at all.

[87] In the present case the court is faced with two possible construction of s. 26(1A), one as advocated by the plaintiffs and the other as contended by the defendants based on the interpretation given by the Attorney-General's Chambers.

[88] Learned counsel for the second to 11th defendants had also sought the aid of the same extract of the Hansard to support their view that in amending s. 26(1A) Parliament had intended that only persons employed or engaged in any establishment, trade, occupation or industry in respect of which the trade union is registered shall join or be accepted or retained as a member of a trade union, the emphasis being on the words 'employed' or "engaged".

[89] However having carefully perused the Minister's speech, I found, as stated earlier, that the Minister's speech "clearly discloses the mischief aimed at or the legislative intention lying behind the ambiguous or obscure words" (to borrow Lord Browne-Wilkinson's words in Pepper v. Hart ), which was to confine the membership of the union only to persons engaged or employed in the trade, occupation or industry in respect of which the union was registered.

[90] As pointed out by counsel for the plaintiffs that was how the Federal Court applied s. 26(1A) as seen in the case of National Union of Newspaper Workers (supra ). There the Federal Court was faced with the following questions of law:

    (a) whether s. 26(1A) of the TUA can be applied by the DGTU to render the entire membership of the union in the respondent companies not eligible and the union incompetent to represent the entire membership?; and

    (b) whether s. 26(1A) of the TUA can be Invoked and applied to de facto derecognize a union and disunionize members when it is admitted that nothing has changed in respect of the establishment, trade, occupation or industry concerned?

[91] The facts giving rise to these two questions of law has been set out earlier and were briefly as follows:

    The National Union of Newspaper Workers (referred to as the NUPW by the Federal Court) was a trade union which was initially recognised by FPSB and STPD (the respondent companies) as a trade union which represented their employees. Both FPSB and STPD by similar letters dated 26 December 1992 sought a ruling from the DGTU on the issue whether the NUPW can continue to represent their employees as they were no longer involved in the newspaper publishing industry. On 12 November 1991, the DGTU carried out investigations and discovered that FPSB was involved with the publication of local text books whereas STPD was in the distribution and marketing of books, magazines and encyclopedias with no involvement at all in the newspaper publishing industry.

[92] Vide letter dated 25 February 1992, the DGTU decided that the employees of FPSB and STPD cannot be accepted or continue to be, members of the NUPW as they were no longer categorised as employees and subsidiaries as stipulated under r. 3.1 of the NUPW's Rules and Constitution. Rule 3.1 provided that "membership" of the Union shall be open to all employees "in the newspaper publishing and subsidiary industries".

[93] One of the issues raised in the High Court was the competency of the DGTU to entertain and consequently to decide on NUPW's eligibility to represent the employees of FPSB and STPD in accordance with s. 26(1A). Hence the two questions of law posed before the Federal Court.

[94] The Federal Court answered both questions in the affirmative and held that s. 26(1A) can be applied by the DGTU to render the entire membership of the union in the respondent companies not eligible and the union incompetent to represent the entire membership and it can be invoked and applied to de facto derecognise a union and disunionise members.

[95] This case therefore illustrates the manner in which s. 26(1A) may be invoked by the DGTU, and its application by the Federal Court was consistent with the interpretation postulated by the first plaintiffs which was to prevent a member of a different trade, industry or occupation from being a member of a union that was not meant for them.

[96] The case of Kempas Edible (supra ) referred to by the defendant in their submission may be distinguished. In that case, there was a trade dispute concerning the non re-employment of one M Mukunan after the retrenchment exercise whereby he was not offered re-employment with the company despite the company having agreed that affected employees would be accorded new employment if there were vacancies in any of the company/group's operating units.

[97] It was held that M Mukunan was neither a workman nor an employee of the company when the union filed the trade dispute, nor was he employed or engaged in any establishment, trade, occupation or industry in respect of which the trade union was registered. Though evidence was adduced that he had been faithfully paying the subscription fees to the union, the situation he was in after the dismissal rendered him ineligible to be a union member by virtue of s. 26(1A). Therefore, the union did not have the locus standi to espouse the claim of M Mukunan.

[98] Similarly with the case of Anthonyamah Anthony & Ors (supra ) referred to by the defendants in support of their argument in their submission, the facts can also be distinguished. In this case, the contracts of employment of the applicants have been terminated since they had not reported for work for more than two days. The applicants were represented by their union (NUPW) at the trade dispute which was subsequently referred to the Industrial Court by the Minister pursuant to s. 26(2) of the IRA. NUPW had by a letter to the Industrial Court dated 4 May 1987 notified the court that it could not represent the applicants as they were not its members by virtue of a ruling made by the Registrar of Trade Unions dated 21 August 1986. The Registrar had ruled that the applicants ceased to be members of NUPW by their refusal to work on 2 October 1985 which amounted to participation in an illegal strike.

[99] The third case referred to by the defendants was Perusahaan Otomobil Kedua Sdn Bhd (supra ). Again the facts were completely different from the instant case. There it was held that the DGTU in making the said decision committed an error of law and thereby exceeded his jurisdiction when he failed to take into account the relevant consideration that the second defendant being registered as an in-house union for the subsidiary company was thereby confined to serving the cause of the said employees within and not those of the applicant company and its subsidiaries.

[100] Section 26(1A) specifically prohibits the second defendant from recruiting members or retaining members if the said members were not employed or engaged in the establishment in which it was registered. Rule 3 of the second defendant clearly limited the scope of its membership to the employees in the subsidiary company. Thus, the first defendant could not extend the scope of membership of the second defendant in contravention of s. 26(1A) of the Act by amending r. 3 of the second defendant.

[101] Learned SFC and counsel for the second to 11th defendants nevertheless sought to argue that the words "if he is not employed or engaged ..." in s. 26(1A) presupposes that a person must be employed in the particular trade or industry of which the union is registered before he can be a member or be retained (as the case may be) as a member of a trade union of the particular trade or industry. (emphasis added)

[102] In their view these words "if he is not employed or engaged" in their plain and ordinary meaning means "be engaged in", "be at work" or "take service with or with an employer". Hence once a person is no longer employed or engaged in any establishment, trade, occupation or industry of which the trade union is registered the person loses his status as a union member. The meaning of these words according to counsel could not be extended to include a person who has been dismissed but whose dismissal was being challenged under s. 20 of the IRA. Nowhere, they contended does s. 26(1A) provide for such a meaning.

[103] I was not persuaded by the defendants' argument primarily because, as had been seen earlier, s. 26(1A) was not enacted for the purpose of empowering the DGTU to automatically divest a member of his membership in the union upon his dismissal or termination notwithstanding his challenge to the dismissal or termination under s. 20 of the IRA. At the risk of repeating myself, as evident from the Minister's speech and illustrated by the case of National Union of Newspaper Workers s. 26(1A) was enacted for the specific purpose of limiting the eligibility of membership of a trade union to the workers of that particular trade or industry in respect of which the union is registered.

[104] The defendants cannot in my view by virtue of the words "... if he is not employed or engaged..." construe s. 26(1A) to mean that a person who has been dismissed or terminated can no longer be retained as a member of a trade union notwithstanding the fact that his dismissal was being challenged under s. 20 of the IRA.

[105] To my mind, if parliament had intended that a workman who had been dismissed would ipso facto lose his status as a member of the union irrespective of whether he has filed a representation under the IRA or not, then parliament would have provided for it explicitly as was done in the case of s. 26(1A) which sought to limit eligibility for membership of a union representing workmen of a particular trade or industry to workmen actually employed in that trade or industry. This was particularly so when, as submitted by the plaintiffs, the effect of such an interpretation would have a drastic effect on the trade union movement in the country. On the defendant's contention that the likelihood of employers victimising or taking action against employees for being a member or being active in a trade union is remote as such an action would constitute an offence under s. 59 of the IRA, as pointed out by the first plaintiff's counsel, thus far no employer has been charged under this section.

[106] Secondly, the interpretation proposed by the defendants would lead to an absurdity in view of the definition of 'workman', 'trade union' and 'trade dispute' in both the TUA and the IRA.

[107] "Trade Union" under s. 2 of the TUA is defined as follows:

    "trade union" or "union" means any association or combination of workmen or employers, being workmen whose place of work is in Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah or Sarawak, as the case may be, or employers employing workmen in Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah or Sarawak, as the case may be:

        (a) within any particular establishment, trade, occupation or industry or within any similar trades, occupations or industries;

        (b) whether temporary or permanent; and

        (c) having among its objects one or more of the following objects:

            (i) the regulation of relations between workmen and employers for the purposes of promoting good industrial relations between workmen and employers, improving the working conditions of workmen or enhancing their economic and social status, or increasing productivity;

            (ia) the regulation of relations between workmen and workmen, or between employers and employers;

            (ii) the representation of either workmen or employers in trade disputes;

            (iiA) the conducting of, or dealing with, trade disputes and matters related thereto; or

            (ii) the promotion or organization or financing of strikes or lock-outs in any trade or industry or the provision of pay or other benefits for its members during a strike or lock-out.

    "Workman" under s. 2 of the TUA means any person, including an apprentice, employed by an employer under a contact of employment to work for hire or reward and for the purposes of any proceedings in relation to a trade dispute includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with or as a consequence of that dispute or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute. (emphasis added)

[108] The same definition of "workman" appears in s. 2 of the IRA.

[109] "Trade dispute" in s. 2 of the TUA is defined as any dispute between an employer and his workmen which is connected with the employment or the conditions of work of any such workmen.

[110] The gist of the first plaintiff's argument (and adopted by the rest of the plaintiffs) was that based on the definition of "workman" in both the TUA and the IRA a person who had been dismissed or discharged and who is challenging his dismissal or discharge as in the case of Mr Solomon would continue to be a member of a union within the meaning assigned to it under the TUA and the IRA.

[111] Learned SFC for the first defendant and Cik Eswary for the second - 11th defendants on the other hand, argued that, the "second component" of the definition of workman ie,:

    and for purposes of any proceedings in relation to a trade dispute include any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with or as a consequence of that dispute or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has lead to that dispute. (emphasis added)

ought not to be read into s. 26(1A) as the word 'member' in that section is not defined. Both Cik Eswary and the SFC urged the court to only consider the "first component" of the definition of workman which reads:

    any person, including an apprentice, employed by an employer under a contract of employment to work for or hire or reward. (emphasis added)

as this was more relevant for the purpose of construing s. 26(1A). In their view the second component of the definition applies only for the purposes of any proceedings in relation to a trade dispute and therefore would not be applicable in the present context.

[112] I did not think it possible for the court to disregard the "second component" of the definition of "workman" as the "second component" (as it was referred to by Cik Eswary in her submission) constitutes an essential component of the definition of "workman" under the TUA. Cik Eswary had argued that the second component was incorporated in the definition of 'workman' in s. 2 of the TUA to give cognisance to one of the objects of a trade union which is to represent the workman who was a member at the time of dismissal and whose dismissal has led to a trade dispute. (see para. (c)(ii) of the definition of "trade union" (supra )). The same applies to the IRA as the definition of "workman" is identical to that in the TUA's. (see p. 23, para. (c)).

[113] Similarly with r. 4.7 of the Constitution of the NUBE which was relied on by the first plaintiff's counsel to support her argument on this issue (see pp. 11 to 12 of this judgment). The said rule was merely a recognition of the right of a dismissed workman to be represented by a trade union in the trade dispute that was brought about by his dismissal. In other words the second component of the definition of workman under the TUA is to enable a dismissed member of a trade union to be represented in a trade dispute that was brought about by his dismissal and in the case of IRA it was also to enable the trade union to represent a workman in a reference under s. 26.

[114] It (ie, the second component of the definition) was not to enable a member who had been dismissed and whose dismissal was being challenged to continue to be a member of a union in every sense of the word including to hold a position in the union.

[115] I was unable to agree with the defendant's argument for the following reasons:

    Firstly, whether or not the "second component" of the definition of workman is intended only for the limited purpose as argued by counsel ie, in the case of the TUA to enable the workman to be represented by a trade union in a trade dispute brought about by his own dismissal and in the case of the IRA, to enable a trade union to represent a workman in a reference under s. 26 of the IRA, is not entirely clear from a reading of the definition of "trade union", "workman" and "trade dispute" both in the TUA and the IRA.

[116] What is clear however is that the "second component" of the definition of "workman" in the TUA means that a workman who is dismissed and who is challenging his dismissal remains, by virtue of this definition, a member of a trade union.

[117] Rule 4.7 of the Constitution and Rules of the first plaintiff fortified by s. 66 of the TUA reflects this position. Rule 3 and the case of Re Singapore Industrial Workers Union (supra ) cited by learned counsel for the second to 11th defendants to support her interpretation of s. 26(1A) relate to the minimum requirements for membership of the union and was therefore not relevant for our purposes.

[118] Thus the defendant's (and the AG's) contention that s. 26(1A) results in a dismissed workman (including one who is challenging his dismissal) losing his right to membership of a union is, as said earlier, absurd, if not untenable.

[119] Whether the aforesaid definition of a workman means that a dismissed member (who is challenging his dismissal) can continue to enjoy all his rights as a member including the right to hold a position in the union is, in the absence of a clear provision stating otherwise a matter of construction.

[120] For this purpose, as submitted by learned counsel for the first plaintiff, a purposive approach is necessary so that the construction of these provisions is consonant with the purpose of the TUA. This is also in line with the current judicial trend as held in the case of All Malayan Estates Staff Union (supra ) which I will elaborate on later.

[121] The TUA was enacted to regulate the formation of trade unions and the trade unions movement in the country. This is reflected in the long title of the Act which states rather succinctly - "An Act relating to trade unions". As submitted by Dato' Ambiga, the TUA is a piece of social legislation with the underlying objective of promoting social harmony between employers and workers.

[122] The speech by the then Minister of Labour and Manpower, Dato' Richard Ho Ung Hun in Parliament when tabling the proposed amendments to the TUA on 3 April 1980 ("the said Bill") underlined this objective when he referred to trade unions in the following terms:

    Trade unionisma mempunyai potensi yang besar sebagai satu kuasa bagi sosial yang mesti di pupok dan di awasi.

[123] The Minister further stressed that:

    Satu kerajaan yang berdemokrasi yang dipilih oleh rakyat seperti kita, mestilah secara jujur mengambil langkah untuk memimpin dan mengatur pertumbuhan trade unionisma kita. (see p. 1681 of the Penyata Rasmi Parlimen Jilid II Bil. 13 bertarikh 3 April 1980).

[124] And again on 11 April 1980, when tabling the said Bill for a second and third reading at the same Parliamentary session the Minister described both the TUA and the IRA as being part of the "Undang-undang sosial Malaysia as seen below:

    Rang Undang-undang ini, bersama-sama dengan Akta Perhubungan Perusahaan (Pindaan) 1980, yang telahpun dibentangkan di Dewan ini dan akan dibaca kali keduanya kelak dalam persidangan ini, adalah merupakan dua buah perundangan penting yang menjadi sebahagian daripada Undang-undang sosial Malaysia. (see p. 662 of the Penyata Rasmi Parlimen Jilid II Bil. 5 bertarikh 11 April 1980).

    (emphasis added)

[125] The purposive approach to construction of a statute is encapsulated in s. 17A of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 which provides that:

    in the interpretation of a provision of an Act, a construction that would promote the purpose or object underlying the Act (whether that purpose of object is expressly stated in the Act or not ) shall be preferred to a construction - that would not promote that purpose or object.

    (emphasis added)

[126] In the case of All Malayan Estates Staff Union (supra ) the Federal Court explained at length the nature and scope of s. 17A and held, inter alia, as follows:

    The choice prescribed in s. 17A of "... a construction that would promote the purpose or object underlying the Act... shall be preferred to construction that would not promote that purpose or object..." can only arise when the meaning of a statutory provision is not plain and is ambiguous. If, therefore, the language of provision is plain and unambiguous s. 17A will have no application as the question of another meaning will not arise.

    Thus, it is only when a provision is capable of bearing two or more different meanings can s. 17A be resorted to in order to determine the one that will promote the purpose or object of the provision. Such an exercise must be undertaken without doing any violence to the plain meaning of the provision. This is a legislative recognition of the purposive approach and is in line with the current trend in statutory interpretation.

[127] In the course of their judgment the Federal Court referred to the House of Lords decision in R (on the application of Quintavalle) v. Secretary of State for Health [2003] 2 All ER 113, in particular, the judgment of Lord Bingham who expressed in clear and lucid terms the task of the court in construing a statute which is thus:

    The basic task of the Court is to ascertain and give effect to the true meaning of what Parliament has said in the enactment to be construed. But that is not to say that attention should be confined and a literal interpretation given to the particular provisions which give rise to difficulty. Such an approach not only encourages immense prolixity in drafting, since the draftsmen will feel obliged to provide expressly for every contingency which may possibly arise. It may also (under the banner of loyalty to the will of Parliament) lead to the frustration of that will, because undue concentration on the minutiae of the enactment may lead the court to neglect the purpose which Parliament intended to achieve when it enacted the statute. Every statute other than a pure consolidating statute is, after all, enacted to make some change, or address some problem, or remove some blemish, or effect some improvement in the national life. The court's task, within the permissible bounds of interpretation, is to give effect to Parliament's purpose. So the controversial provisions should be read in the context of the statute as a whole, and the statute as a whole should be read in the historical context of the situation which led to its enactment. (emphasis added)

[128] Thus applying s. 17A and the principles enunciated in the aforesaid judgment, the purposive approach would be preferable in construing s. 26(1A) and the other relevant provisions of the TUA, that is, the definition "workman", "trade union" and "trade dispute" as a literal interpretation of these provisions would negate the very purpose for which the TUA was enacted.

[129] In other words the interpretation advocated by the defendants would, instead of promoting social harmony, result in "union busting" (see p. 15 (supra ) on the effects of union busting as submitted by learned counsel of the first plaintiff). Such a consequence as submitted by counsel for the plaintiffs could not have been intended by the legislature.

[130] In this regard I would also disagree with Cik Eswary's contention that s. 26(1B) (read together with s. 29(1) of the TUA) and r. 14 of the first plaintiff's Constitution and Rules clearly prohibited a dismissed member including one who is challenging his dismissal as in the case of Mr Solomon from holding the position of an officer of a trade union.

[131] Apart from the aforesaid grounds the plaintiffs also relied on the following argument to counter the defendant's contention on the effect of s. 26(1A) on a dismissed employee.

[132] The plaintiffs' argument was as follows:

    It would be premature to decide whether a member of a union has lost his membership due to a dismissal which is being challenged and where a representation has been made under s. 20 and the matter referred to the Industrial Court for adjudication, because when an employee is dismissed and the matter referred to the Industrial Court under s. 20 of the IRA, the burden is on the employer to prove that the dismissal was done with just cause and excuse. Thus until and unless the Industrial Court has disposed of a representation made under s. 20 of the IRA for reinstatement another court may not deem that the workman has forfeited his union membership. This was the ratio decidendi in the case of National Union of Teachers in Independent Schools, West Malaysia, (supra ). In that case out of 53 teachers who were members of teachers' union 18 had resigned from the union on various dates and 35 had their services terminated by way of non-renewal of their contracts.

[133] The court was confronted with the issue of whether the Union had the necessary locus standi to make representation to the Industrial Court as none of the teachers were members of the Union for the reason stated above. The school and the union were at the material time locked in two disputes; one was a dispute over a collective agreement on wages and terms and conditions employed in the school, and the other was a dispute over the alleged wrongful dismissal of 35 teachers. The dispute over the collective agreement was referred to the Industrial Court by the Minister on 12 January 1987 for adjudication and the dispute over the alleged wrongful dismissal of 35 teachers was referred to the Industrial Court on 14 August 1987.

[134] In the case before the High Court, the Industrial Court was concerned only with the dispute over the collective agreement. The dispute over the alleged wrongful dismissal of 35 teachers was before another division of the court.

[135] It was held by the High Court that it was premature for an Industrial Court to decide whether the union had members or not when another Industrial Court had yet to decide on the representations made to it under s. 20 of the IRA. Eusoff Chin J (as he then was) in his judgment observed as follows:

    The Industrial Court here made a finding that although the school had not closed down, and was still in operation at the date of hearing, there was not a teacher employed by the school who was a union member because those who were union members had either resigned from the union or because their contracts were not renewed by the school. The Industrial Court held that the union could not represent and act in a dispute on behalf of the school teachers who were not its members or no longer its members, and so the union had no locus standi before the court.

    As stated earlier, the dispute concerning the alleged wrongful dismissal of the 35 teachers who were union members was referred to another division of the Industrial Court by the Minister on 14 August 1987. That division had not determined and made an award in respect of that dispute on 27 February 1988, when the question of locus standi of the union was heard by the Industrial Court. In holding that the union had no locus standi because it no longer had any members, the Industrial Court was in fact adjudicating the dispute of wrongful dismissal of the teachers who were union members, and had come to the conclusion that the teachers' services had been lawfully terminated. This Industrial Court had no jurisdiction to determine that dispute, because that very dispute had not been referred to it by the Minister, but to another division of the Industrial Court to adjudicate.

[136] In the present case Mr Solomon was seeking reinstatement to his employment with his former employers, CIMB Bank Bhd. Relying on the aforesaid decision the plaintiffs contended that until and unless final determination of the reinstatement is decided upon by the courts, it would be premature for anyone to declare that his membership as a member of the first plaintiff is automatically terminated due to his termination from employment.

[137] I agreed with the plaintiff's submission on this issue and the decision in the National Union of Teachers in Independent Schools, West Malaysia as it is in accord with the underlying jurisprudence of s. 20 of the IRA.

[138] Although, as mentioned earlier, the Industrial Court subsequently found that Mr Solomon's (and the other eight members') dismissal was with just cause and excuse, I also agreed with learned counsel for the first plaintiff that as Mr Solomon (and the other eight members) had filed an application for judicial review, the argument that it would be premature for the court at this juncture to hold that a dismissed workman would automatically lose his union membership notwithstanding his challenge to the dismissal, remained a valid argument.

Conclusion

[139] Thus for the reasons stated above I agreed with the plaintiffs' submission that the defendants' interpretation of s. 26(1A) on the status of a member of a trade union who had been dismissed and who had challenged his dismissal, was in the circumstances erroneous and I therefore allowed the plaintiffs' application in terms prayed for in prayers (1) and (2) of the said application.

[140] In arriving at my decision I had considered carefully the arguments canvassed by all the plaintiffs and the defendants, in particular, the reasons set out by Cik Eswary in paras. (a) to (f) of pp. 28 to 29 of this judgment on why a dismissed member whose dismissal was challenged can never be considered to be a member of a trade union. In my view, those reasons whilst arguably valid could not constitute sufficient justification for construing s. 26(1A) the way in which the defendants have construed it.

[141] It should be emphasised however that the court's decision herein was in respect of the specific issue raised before the court and in that sense was restricted to the fact situation before the court.

[142] Finally, by way of post script I would like to refer to two other issues that were raised in the course of submission before the court. There were:

    (i) The ILO Convention

    In the course of her submission before the court, learned counsel for the first plaintiff had alluded to the letter addressed to the Minister of Human Resources by the MTUC (see p. 180, encl. 2) that a complaint will be made to the ILO arising from the interpretation of s. 26(1A) given by the Attorney-General's Chambers. Learned counsel had submitted that such an interpretation would contravene the ILO convention namely C98, ie, the Convention on the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention 1949 which Malaysia ratified in 1961 ("the said Convention"). Both learned SFC, and counsel for the second to the 11th defendants argued that the question of the said Convention being transgressed did not arise as the provision of the said Convention had been incorporated in the IRA notably in ss. 4, 5 and 7 and s. 59. Section 59 in particular provide the penalties that would be imposed on employers found guilty of "union busting".

    Alternatively both counsel opined that even if there was a conflict the court has a duty to give effect to a national law and not international law, citing the Court of Appeal in Singapore's decision in Seow Teck Ming & Anor v. Tan Ah Yeo & Anor [1991] 3 CLJ 2731; [1991] 4 CLJ (Rep) 576 as authority and also Lord Denning's decision in Blackburn v. Attorney-General [1971] 2 All ER 1380.

    Dato' Ambiga, on the other hand referred to Lord Diplock LJ's proposition in Salomon v. Commissioners of Customs & Excise [1967] 2 QB 116, which was as follows:

        ... there is a prima facie presumption that Parliament does not intend to act in breach of international law, including therein specific treaty obligations; and if one of the meanings which can reasonably be ascribed to the legislation is consonant with the treaty obligations and another and others are not, the meaning which is consonant is to be preferred.

    In the light of my findings above I did not think it necessary to express an opinion on this issue except to state that whilst I agree with the view expressed by the Singapore Court of Appeal in Seow Teck Ming (supra ) that it is settled law that the duty of the court is to give effect to a national law and not international law if there were a real conflict between them, Lord Diplock's proposition (supra ) to my mind is equally sound.

    (ii) Position in other jurisdictions

    Pursuant to the court's query as to the position in other jurisdictions on the issue before the court, learned counsel for the first plaintiff had looked at the trade union legislations in Singapore, India, UK and Australia to see whether there was an equivalent provision to our s. 26(1A).

    From a perusal of the relevant legislation in Singapore (the Singaporean Trade Unions Act Chapter 333); India (the Indian Trade Unions Act 1926); the UK (Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 and the Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act 1993); and Australia (Fair Work (Registered Organizations) Act 2009), it would appear that there is no equivalent provision to our s. 26(1A) or at least there is no clear provision that provides that a member of a trade union who has been terminated or dismissed from employment would automatically lose his membership upon such termination or dismissal.

[2014] 5 CLJ 213